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CAN NATO SURVIVE PERESTROIKA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1989

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89 9 19 054

AD-A212 508

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Non-Classified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS None		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army Command and General Staff College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ATZL-SWD-GD	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900			9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
					WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Can NATO Survive <u>Perestroika</u> ?					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Hintz, Willis Lee MAJ IN USAR					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b. TIME COVERED FROM 880719 TO 890602		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 890518	
				15. PAGE COUNT 113	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	NATO, Perestroika, imperial overstretch, Glasnost, venzapnost, maskirovka, Gorbachev economic policy, strategic deception, economic influence, diplomacy		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Can NATO Survive Perestroika analyzes the Soviet Union's economic program "perestroika" and its effects on the military alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treatise questions the interpretation of perestroika as merely economic reform. The central issues addressed: is this purely an economic restructuring; does perestroika also enhance political "venzapnost" (surprise) and economic "maskirovka" (deception) in support of historical Soviet national goals; and finally what is the potential impact of perestroika on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This thesis concludes with the assessment that perestroika is at its foundation an economic program. However, it also argues that Soviet political ambitions and strategies have not been abandoned but that the Soviets have adapted the means for achieving their ends through a required economic recovery plan. The research concludes with the theory that perestroika shifts Soviet aggression in Europe to a new plane--economic warfare.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Non-Classified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACT

Can NATO Survive Perestroika

Can NATO Survive Perestroika analyzes the Soviet Union's economic program "perestroika" and its effects on the military alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The treatise questions the interpretation of perestroika as merely economic reform. The central issues addressed: is this purely an economic restructuring; does perestroika also enhance political "venzapnost" (surprise) and economic "maskirovka" (deception) in support of historical Soviet-national goals; and finally what is the potential impact of perestroika on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This thesis concludes with the assessment that perestroika is at its foundation an economic program. However, it also argues that Soviet political ambitions and strategies have not been abandoned but that the Soviets have adapted the means for achieving their ends through a required economic recovery plan.

The research concludes with the theory that perestroika shifts Soviet aggression in Europe to a new plane--economic warfare. (L.R.)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to many who have supported my efforts to complete both this thesis and my academic year at the Command and General Staff College.

My classmates in Section 1-B, fellow MMAS candidates Kim Welliver and Jim Ransick, and our (ACE) LTC Dennis Perry provided encouragement throughout the year.

Furthermore, the members of my committee, LTC Max Harshman, LTC Donald Vik, and Dr. Graham Turbiville, patiently and methodically challenged my theories and concepts with academic honesty. Although not an official member of the committee, I wish to acknowledge the support and interest of LTC James Holbrook.

But my most sincere thanks goes to my wife, Penelope Hamblin, for her demanding critique of my work. It is to Penny that I am most grateful.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

"There must be chaos, that out of chaos may come forth new stars; there must be chaos that new worlds may be born." Nineteen--eighteen was a beginning--from which, today, we are witness to another beginning."¹

From the Soviet Union's 1985 Communist Party Central Committee emerged an accelerating impetus for the rebirth of a faltering Soviet economy. The Communist Party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, labeled this new program "perestroika" which means restructuring.

Gorbachev describes perestroika as a demonstration of the Soviet resolve to overcome economic stagnation, and the USSR's determination to create "a dependable and effective mechanism for the acceleration of social and economic progress and giving it greater dynamism."² The Communist Party leadership has subsequently refined this definition, proclaiming perestroika to also be a comprehensive and

¹William Pfaff, "Reflections (Central and Eastern Europe) Where the Wars Came From" New Yorker Magazine, Dec. 26, 1988, which cites the Belgian Socialist Emile Vandervelde commenting on his "own visit to revolutionary Petrograde with a phrase from Nietzsche."

²Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Harper & Row, New York, 1987, p. 34.

massive initiative: a "development of democracy and socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative and creative endeavor;" it is "improved order and discipline;" more openness or "glasnost;" and a tolerance for "criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society."³ The Soviets believe this economically based program will at worst double, and at best triple, their production levels by the year 2000.⁴

This comprehensive approach to economic and political crisis raises many questions for both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization armed forces and the governments they serve. The critical question centers on interpretation: is this latest machination purely an economic restructuring or does it also enhance political "vnezapnost" (surprise) and economic "maskirovka" (deception)?⁵ Is perestroika solely

³Ibid. p. 34.

⁴Gorbachev, p. 166.

⁵Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. March, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought", Applied Tactical Operations, Vol II, A396, Academic Year 1988-89, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. p. 411. Stevens and March contend that surprise and deception, in a political-military context, are characterized by two concepts defying analytical and precise description. The authors claim "both lack planning phases which can be easily identified or results which can be problematically determined."

Furthermore, they say successful surprise is "an event that cannot generally be predicted beyond the small circle of individuals who planned for and executed it. Once political or military surprise has occurred, of course, it becomes part of history. Its description is then left to historians who may or may not unravel all of the many factors which contributed to its success. This

an internal economic revolution; may it also enhance the continuation of a Soviet strategy to sunder the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and weaken United States military presence in Europe? And what will be the impact of perestroika on NATO?

Background

Gorbachev describes perestroika as economic revolution, but advocates neither a complete and forcible purge of the communist government-managed economy nor the abandonment of Leninism. Gorbachev identifies Leninism as the inspiration to launch perestroika: "We have always learned, and continue to learn, from Lenin's creative approach to the theory and practice of socialist construction. We are using his scientific methods and mastering his art of analyzing concrete situations."⁶ The fact that Mikhail Gorbachev clearly identifies Leninism as

characterization seems to define surprise: it is an event which comes to be known, and perhaps understood, almost exclusively after it has happened." p. 411.

"At the strategic level, maskirovka is to be implemented through decisions made by the Soviet Supreme High Command. It includes a broad range of measures for clandestinely securing the preparation of strategic operations and campaigns, as well as for disorienting the enemy with regard to the actual intentions of Soviet forces. It is also at this level that deceptive measures known as "disinformation" are likely to be orchestrated." p. 422.

⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, p. 45

perestroika's ideological foundation raises the question, is the doctrine of a communist world united against capitalism and "in perpetual conflict with hostile imperialist states until the world is communized"⁷ also central to perestroika?

While the Communist leadership may be capable of reinterpreting Leninism, exorcising Russian xenophobia is a different matter. Mikhail Gorbachev alleges that "Ever since the October Revolution, we have been under permanent threat of potential aggression." The Soviet leader cites the civil war which involved foreign forces, the intervention by fourteen states, and economic blockade and cordon sanitaire as evidence of the threats to the Soviet Union's security. Gorbachev also identifies the lack of diplomatic recognition (by the US up to 1933), armed provocations in the East, a devastating and bloody war against fascism which came from the West and, "the plans for an atomic attack on the Soviet Union by the American military and the National Security Council."⁸ Have these Soviet fears now been suddenly nullified? Have the heretofore military security interests and objectives been dissolved thereby allowing perestroika; and if so, by what?

If the Soviet European national interests of economic development remain, do the Kremlin's objectives of

⁷Ivo J. Lederer, "The Pattern of Soviet Objectives" in Russian Foreign Policy, New Haven Yale University Press, 1967, p. 3-38

⁸Mikhail Gorbachev, p. 45.

importation of technology, the limiting of cultural penetration, and the goal to obtain economic leverage over the European Economic Community also remain as a Soviet goal?

In light of perestroika, the Soviet's national military security objectives for Europe are also in question. What effect will perestroika have on Communist objectives for East European domination, on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or on efforts to restrain Germany and avoid nuclear war. Marxist-Leninist doctrine has historically achieved these European national interests through "four traditional categories of objectives:

- (1) the stabilization of frontiers to protect the motherland by defeating neighboring powers, extending Russian control over relatively uninhabited territories, or relying on existing natural barriers;
- (2) the attempt to establish favorable conditions for economic growth, long recognized by Russian statesmen as important for natural security and one of the motivations behind the desire for ice-free ports;
- (3) the unification of territories considered Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or natural claims if they could add to Russian strength and provide defense in depth;
- (4) participation in alliances, both short- and long-term, and in international organizations designed to promote international security."⁹

What influence do these national security goals continue to play in a Soviet society influenced by perestroika? Is the weaver of the perestroika tapestry

⁹Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Johns, Jr., American Defense Policy John Hopkins Press, 1968, p. 295.

dyeing the threads of Soviet political and military doctrine a unique hue? Is there a challenge to the theory that war is a continuation of politics by a different means? Political scientists say "such periods of formal international calm do not stop change. The conflict merely is transferred to a different plane."¹⁰ Has the proliferation of nuclear weapons made total war unacceptable and therefore politics the continuation of war and economics the means?

Assumptions

The foundation of both Soviet political and military doctrine is the Clausewitzian theory that war is a continuation of politics by a different means.¹¹ The economic restructuring by Gorbachev represents the Soviet acknowledgment that the Clausewitzian theory, that of total war, is no longer acceptable in the nuclear age. Perestroika is changing Soviet doctrine and reverses Clausewitz's theory in that the proliferation of nuclear weapons means objectives formerly achieved by military means must be pursued by political means. It is the premise of

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner, The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, Jane's Information Group LTD, Over Wallop, Hampshire, 1988, p. 62.

this thesis that perestroika shifts Soviet aggression to a new plane - an economic one. Robert Wesson of Rutgers University believes "it was obvious to Russians that if they could take over thoroughly the ways of the West, the size of their realm should enable them to overcome the world."¹² The concept in Soviet history is an old one, the means is new.

Limitations

This thesis is limited by time in the sense that perestroika has yet to mature. Thus, it has yet to provide a discernable political personality, patterns, or direction. Perestroika is a political-economic continuum whose dimension has not ripened.

In terms of immediacy, perestroika research is limited to publications written at the time of, and published after, perestroika's 1985 emergence. This is not to say that analysis, conclusions, or projections cannot be measured against history. History provides valuable measurements from which we can gauge probability. However, until a definition of perestroika, or parameters, is agreed upon by political and economic scholars--or perhaps the Soviets

¹²Robert G. Wesson, Rutgers University Press, 1974 p. 39.

themselves--these early life fluctuations in denotation will continue to plague the study of perestroika.

This scope of the thesis is also limited in that the research examines only the effects of perestroika on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Not considered is perestroika's impact on Sino-Soviet relations, Warsaw Pact nations, non-European satellite states of the Soviet Union, relations with Third World nations, or the impact on the relations with other non-aligned nations.

Finally, it is not within the purview of this thesis to address the in-depth implications of perestroika for arms negotiations or force restructuring within the Eastern or Western alliances. While conventional force levels do affect perestroika's development, the assessment of what constitutes balanced forces is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Significance of The Study

In his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Yale University history professor Paul Kennedy writes "that the international system is subject to constant changes, not only those caused by the day-to-day actions of statesmen and the ebb and flow of political and military events, but also those caused by the deeper transformations in the

foundations of world power, which in time make their way through to the surface."¹³ Perestroika is such a change.

In politics, imbalance solicits chaos and revolution. Governments counterpoise political will, economic power, and military expense against each other, each being brought back into balance before the nation reaches its "imperial overstretch" or culmination point. Instability within nations may be misconstrued as a lack of political, economic, and military will and power. This condition is that which Professor Kennedy describes as "imperial overstretch" or that point at which a nation is no longer able to militarily defend the sum total of its global interests and obligations. It is the signal of the fall..."Whatever the likelihood of nuclear or conventional clashes between the major states, it is clear that important transformations in the balance are occurring, and will continue, probably at a faster pace than before. What is more, they are occurring at the two separate but interacting levels of economic production and strategic power."

Two academics using the language of their individual disciplines have arrived at the same conclusion. While historian Paul Kennedy and economic researcher Judy Shelton use diverse terminology, they agree in principal that the

¹³Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987. p.536.

Soviet Union is in a state of imbalance and that perestroika is Gorbachev's counter-balance.¹⁴

As the Soviets' counter-balance, perestroika potentially will have a profound influence beyond the borders of the USSR. The Communist government is feeling the effects of "the law of the increasing cost of war." Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, remarks if the Soviets "neglect to provide adequate military defenses, they may be unable to respond if a rival Power takes advantage of them; if they spend too much on armaments-or, more usually, upon maintaining at growing costs the military obligations they had assumed in a previous period-they are likely to overstrain themselves, like an old man attempting to work beyond his natural strength."¹⁵

The timing of Gorbachev's economic revolution, when juxtaposed against the proposals of the European Community economic developments, accentuates the potential influence which perestroika can generate in world politics for decades. In addition to the above issues, there is the question of perestroika's impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. Furthermore perestroika has the potential to rewrite the relationship of the United States to NATO. Perestroika

¹⁴Judy Shelton, The Coming Soviet Crash: Gorbachev's Desperate Pursuit of Credit in Western Financial Markets, the Free Press, New York, 1989.

¹⁵Paul Kennedy, p. 540.

might mutate the relationships of the European Economic Community. And, finally, perestroika may weaken the bipolarization of East-West politics worldwide as well as the superpowers' relationships with developing nations.

Methodology

The analytical approach used in researching Can NATO Survive Perestroika begins with Mikhail Gorbachev's definitions of perestroika. Only by understanding what is meant by the term, from a Soviet perspective, may conclusions be drawn. The definition includes identifying stated goals and time objectives for perestroika.

A primary objective of this analysis is the identification of probable causes generating the need for restructuring. This study will compare and contrast similar reforms in Soviet history. This historical research will include the causes and effects of previous economic reforms, their solutions, and analysis of their impact on Soviet society. We can then measure the objectives of perestroika. Furthermore, the researcher can draw conclusions from historical attempts at solutions, and observe their impact on Soviet society, as well as can measure their successes and failures, similarities, and dissimilarities to perestroika.

All sciences have their limitations, including political science. This study discusses the limitations of perestroika. And as all nations are influenced by their history, the Soviet Union is also bound by its history. Gorbachev is limited by the values of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet national will. Furthermore, the politics of the military asserts further constraints on Gorbachev's reforms. There are also the limitations imposed by historical agreements and alliances.

There is also the limitation imposed by image. To what extent will the Soviet Union willingly give up its image as a world leader in its attempts to come to terms with internal political and economic problems. Again, the political scientist must struggle to balance the factors of political will, economic power, and military expense against each other. Are the Soviet leaders willing to allow Gorbachev to push each factor to the point of unbalance before realizing its "imperial overstretch" or culmination point? What is the culminating point at which the Kremlin and Gorbachev will allow perestroika to mature before the perceived instability is misconstrued as a lack of political, economic, and military will and power?

A subsequent question to be analyzed is whether national strategic goals, if any, are superseded by perestroika. Here we examine four historical goals of the Soviet Union and the impact of perestroika on them. A

reading of Soviet history and contemporary writings indicates that these goals are stabilized borders, influence and dominance in European economic affairs and decisions, unification of territories considered historically Russian, and dissolving of NATO and the American influence in Europe.

This study will further examine how perestroika affects the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It will begin its analysis by discussing the reasons for establishing NATO, its mission, and strategy. Following this will come an analysis of the impact, positive and negative, of perestroika on NATO. The examination will conclude with a look at the changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since its inception and since the introduction of perestroika. Included is a discussion of the potential dissolution of the NATO alliance.

The final analysis and conclusions will also be addressed in the concluding chapter. On the basis of historical patterns and current trends, the future of NATO, as well as the possible impact of perestroika on the European Economic Community, will be discussed.

The conclusions address future actions which may be taken by the leadership of the United States and NATO to overcome the initiatives generated by perestroika.

CHAPTER TWO

Gorbachev Defines Perestroika

In 1985 Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion a new program called perestroika. This new strategy was to be a state sponsored revolution, not just another Communist Party administration change in policy. It was to be sponsored not only from above but from below as well: the Soviet worker was to be a party to the change. It was as much an attitude as it was economic and political policy.

There is little argument that perestroika has engendered controversy, both inside and outside the Soviet Union. There is considerable argument, in the West and the USSR as well, over what perestroika is or is not. Abetting the controversy is the Western perception that the tenets of communism in general, and Marxism-Leninism specifically, can be manipulated to support arguments of necessity. As Soviet specialist Allen Lynch notes, "indeed, an entire department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party is devoted to providing exactly such a service for Soviet

leaders and journalists."¹ Perestroika's complex nature is complicating the debate, but its primary objective is economic reform. The former Under Secretary General of the United Nations, and Soviet defector, Arkady Schevchenko chastises a western failure to understand the importance of slogans in the USSR.

A seductive slogan is a most powerful political instrument. The Americans don't understand that.²

While perestroika has many aspects, it is primarily an economic revolution calling for the overcoming of stagnation in the Soviet economy.³ It aims to bring about an accelerating standard of living and productivity by developing self-government through initiative, creativity and "order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society."⁴ Perestroika is furthermore a return to the works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism which provide the Communist leadership "an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought,

¹Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England, 1987, p. 17.

²Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow, Ballantine Books, New York, 1985, p. 133.

³Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Harper & Row, New York, 1987, p. 63.

⁴Ibid. p. 34.

theoretical wealth and political sagacity."⁵ Perestroika is subsequently defined by Mikhail Gorbachev as a mass initiative creating social and economic progress.

Central to Gorbachev's plan are three concepts which need to be understood in their Russian (cultural) and Soviet (political) context: perestroika, glasnost and demokratizatsia. Perestroika literally means "restructuring." According to Gorbachev's way of thinking, restructuring applies to broad policies in public administration and economic management reorganization. Its goals: the removal of redundancies in leadership, management, and the work-force.

Glasnost literally means "giving voice", and is being commonly defined as freedom of discussion. This freedom of discussion is a key factor in Gorbachev's design of identifying Soviet social and economic problems. By permitting open discussion Gorbachev hopes innovative solutions will surface. This should not be misconstrued as freedom of speech. Soviet citizens are only permitted to openly discuss alternative remedies within the context of social usefulness as defined by the Party.

Demokratizatsia is best translated as democratization, and to the Soviet way of thinking this is a curtailment of

⁵Ibid. p. 24-26.

privileges and power of the bureaucratic elites, not political pluralism.⁶

While it is important to know the definitions of perestroika, glasnost and demokratizatsia, it is also important to know what perestroika is not in order to understand the Gorbachev revolution. While primarily an economic revolution, Gorbachev's restructuring program is not solely confined to the economy. Secondly, Gorbachev's reforms do not attempt to restore or introduce either capitalism or a market economy. And finally perestroika is a long-range plan that "is not being introduced overnight (as Hungary's was in 1968), but over years."⁷

While Gorbachev seems convinced of the Soviets' capacity for self-perfection, and for greater vision in dealing with present problems of social progress, at the same time he realizes that improving socialism is not a spontaneous process. Gorbachev realizes logical and unbiased analysis is the means for success. But Gorbachev asserts that the foundation of his program relies "on the initiative and creativity of the masses; on the active participation of the widest sections of the population in

⁶ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Gorbachev, "Reform", and the USSR: Gorbachev's Strategy of Reform, The Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, Canada 1987, p. 27.

⁷ The Economist, "Gorbanomics for Beginners" The Economist, London 9 April 1988 p. 4.

the implementation of the reforms planned."⁸ This active participation of the widest sections of the Soviet citizenship is what Gorbachev terms as perestroika's democratization.

Why Gorbachev Says Perestroika is Necessary

One traditional objective pursued by Soviet Russia, and recognized as important for natural security, is the attempt to establish favorable conditions for economic growth. Yet despite Soviet plans, such as the 1961 Twenty-second Party Congress' pledge that Soviet Russia would be first in per capita income by 1980, Russia's exports in 1987 to the industrial West and Japan were worth only \$20 billion a year. This is less than Taiwan's or South Korea's. The majority of the Soviet Union's exports, some 80%, are in the form of energy and raw materials. The editors and publishers of The Economist magazine assert "if a country's foreign trade is the test of its economic virility, Russia looks sadly impotent."⁹ The Soviet press reports a no-growth

⁸Gorbachev, p. 44.

⁹The Economist, "Trade beyond the petrodollar", The Economist, London, England, 9 April 1988, p. 13.

economy in the first half of the 1980's within the industrial sector.

The Soviet economy and standard of living have been headed steadily downward since 1976. As The Economist notes a "housewife in Omsk probably has to spend at least six hours longer doing her shopping each week than a housewife in Omaha"¹⁰ and meat is still considered a luxury in Russia. Agriculture bottomed out from 1979 to 1984 with a zero or less-than-zero growth rate. Despite slight recoveries in 1978, 1980 and 1983 the Soviet consumers have experienced a consistent loss in their standard of living. The Soviet worker's national income increase dropped from 4.2 percent in 1983 to 3.5 percent a year later; his consumption dropped from 3.5 percent to 2.6 percent. One specialist notes that "the growth of the Soviet gross national product according to the Western definition is likely to have been around 3 percent in 1983 and between 2 percent and 2.5 percent in 1984."¹¹ It is understandable that the goal of Mikhail Gorbachev is overcoming economic and technological backwardness.

¹⁰The Economist, "The Soviet Economy: Russian Roulette, The Economist, London 9 April 88.

¹¹Hans-Hermann Hohmann, "The Soviet Economy at the End of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan: Counting on Gorbachev," The Soviet Union 1984/85: Events, Problems, Perspectives, edited by the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, Westview Press, 1986, p. 124.

The Soviet leadership recognized in the late 1970's that their economic practices were not working. There was a general slowdown in the momentum of industrial growth. The number of economic failures was increasing yearly. The standard of living was declining. Mikhail Gorbachev charges that "a kind of 'breaking mechanism' affecting social and economic development formed" and occurred at a time "when scientific and technological revolution opened up new prospects for economic and social progress."¹²

An analysis of the situation showed that in the last fifteen years the national income had dropped by more than half and was reaching the point of stagnation or depression. As has been shown, some of the economic indicators had already dropped well below a zero-growth rate. The Soviet Union was aimed at a head-on crash with depression.

These economic trends, coupled with a sobering loss of international face, set the stage for Gorbachev's new economic programs. The loss of the war in Afghanistan, the battle to halt missile deployment in Europe, and political corruption were cited in the West as evidence of a society and economic system on the decline, "...even in the health of the Soviet population (in contrast to the trend in all western countries, life expectancy, especially for men, had actually been falling). But the heart of the trouble was

¹²Gorbachev, p. 18-19.

economic."¹³ Hoover Institution research fellow Judy Shelton believes the biggest threat to global authority of the Soviet Union and its status as a working model of socialism

"is the massive budget deficit it is carrying. For years, the Kremlin has had to resort to printing money to paper over chronic revenue shortfalls. That is a recipe for inflation, no matter what the ideological tenets of the system. The Soviet Union is not, of course, the utopia where money doesn't matter; under perestroika, it matters very much indeed."¹⁴

Gorbachev's Goals for Perestroika

Gorbachev's ultimate goal for "restructuring" is a strong and competitive Soviet economy. His program for achieving that goal includes: first, domestic economic considerations in which Gorbachev identifies putting "the economy into some kind of order" and "tighten up discipline" as the "most immediate priority, which we naturally first looked to"; Gorbachev's second ambition was the elimination of redundancies in both politics and management by raising "the level of organization and responsibility; and his third

¹³ The Economist, "The Soviet Economy: Russian Roulette" The Economist, London, 9 April 1988 p. 3

¹⁴ Judy Shelton, The Coming Soviet Crash, Gorbachev's Desperate Pursuit of Credit in Western Financial Markets, Free Press, New York, 1989 p. 203.

aspiration was that of foreign economic considerations -- through diplomacy and consumer product development expand the Soviet's economic relations with the European Economic Community and to "catch up in areas where we were behind."¹⁵

Gorbachev says his program of perestroika has tackled these issues of controlling the exportation of natural resources and currency, eliminating redundancies in both politics and management, and expanding economic relations with Europe.¹⁶

The first priority of perestroika is economic--controlling exportation of natural resources and currency. This is the leading, and most important, goal of the Gorbachev leadership -- economic recovery. The Soviet Union is borrowing on credit from the Western markets at a rate of \$700 million a month. The gross indebtedness of the Soviets

¹⁵Gorbachev, p. 24-26. Additionally on this point, Judy Shelton, in her article "Confronting the Soviet Financial Offensive" The Wall Street Journal, New York, 22 March 88, contends that since Mikhail Gorbachev took over three years ago, total Soviet "indebtedness to the West has increased dramatically--rising about 50%. Under Mr. Gorbachev's direction, total Soviet debt has gone to about \$37.5 billion from about \$25.6 billion."...."The Soviets owe \$25.9 billion to Western commercial banks, compared with \$11.3 billion about three years ago. Moscow also owes nearly \$12 billion in trade credits backed by Western governments."... "Mr. Gorbachev has opened up Soviet borders to permit foreigners to invest in joint ventures and is receiving numerous propositions. He settled with Britain and Switzerland on czarist debts to clear the way for Soviet Eurobond offerings--and proceeded in January to float the Soviet Union's first public bond offering on international capital markets. Now the Kremlin is making noises about wanting to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank."

¹⁶Ibid, p. 92.

to the West went from \$21.8 billion in 1984 to a high of \$38.2 billion in 1986. The dominant exports of the Soviet Union, oil and natural gas, are earning only \$11 billion, down 40 percent from 1984 figures. "The hard currency debt of the entire seven-nation East bloc now stands at nearly \$127 billion."¹⁷ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates this is an increase of 55% from 1984.

It is also estimated that of the \$29 billion in Soviet hard currency available in 1988 over half was spent in economic assistance for allies such as Cuba, Vietnam and Nicaragua.¹⁸ Such economic conditions, says Mikhail Gorbachev, make the time ripe for reform in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader claims a continuation of the uncontrolled military expenditures of the Brezhnev years is creating an imbalance between economic power and the Soviet's ability to carry out its political will.

A second goal for restructuring is political. Gorbachev's subsequent restructuring priority addresses the issue of raising "the level of organization and responsibility" beginning at the top political strata within the Soviet Union.¹⁹ His objective is the purging of an

¹⁷The Wall Street Journal, "Going Into the Red" (Review & Outlook), The Wall Street Journal, New York, 7 Dec 1987.

¹⁸ Wall Street Journal, "Going Into the Red (Review & Outlook) The Wall Street Journal, New York, 7 DEC 1987, p. 22.

¹⁹Gorbachev, p. 92.

ineffective political system and its leadership. Article 12 of the Communist Constitution protected leaders from both responsibility and accountability. Once in office, party leaders had no fear of losing their jobs or of being held accountable for productivity, quality control, or poor management. Article 12 came into being in the late 1950's as Nikita Khrushchev, in exchange for support for reforms, freed the Party hierarchies from the penalty of death, a fear driven by the realities of the Stalin years. Later under Brezhnev even the fear of dismissal was removed. These two compromises, together, created what Gorbachev terms the "breaking system" of the Soviet economy, a mechanism which is unable and unwilling to adjust to market demands. What started out as a plan to motivate the Soviet economy in reality killed initiative. The communist leadership had been freed from responsibility and accountability while being virtually guaranteed social and political position for life. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, like Gorbachev, were attempting to reform the Soviet economy. But according to Gorbachev, his predecessors' political maneuvers stiffened the economy.

In an unprecedented move Gorbachev revised the Article 12 rule, so that now "Party members are responsible for criminal activities to State and Party organs - an unprecedented wording, which places State organs ahead of

the Party."²⁰ Furthermore, not only are Party members being held accountable for their actions, they now may be prosecuted for criminal activity even while holding office.

The Gorbachevian change has cut deeply into the veins of the Communist Party. Eighty percent of the Party roster has been cut from the rolls, and at least 42 ministers have been reassigned. In late April, 1989, the Communist Party purged top party officials from its rosters. The list included 110 inactive party officials, 74 full voting and 36 nonvoting members, of the Central Committee or party auditing commission members. Moreover, 24 non-voting junior leaders were elevated to voting status within the Central Committee. The move was interpreted by some political observers as a move to rid a block of Soviet leaders who were not supportive of Gorbachev's perestroika program. Party ideologist Vadim A. Medvedev claims the changes were a result of March elections, and a voter mandate in support of perestroika. A big loser was the military which suffered a cut of nine generals and marshals, leaving 15 military members in the Central Committee.²¹

His recent proposal allowing multiple candidates in local elections "is presumably intended to motivate ordinary

²⁰Rakowska-Harmstone, 29-31.

²¹The New York Times, "Soviets oust 110 leaders", reprinted in the Kansas City Times, April 26, 1989, p. 1.

people and improve regime standing. It is not without precedent, having been done in Hungary and Poland."²²

Brezhnev recognized that he needed worker support. Gorbachev too recognized this need, but unlike his predecessors, was able to turn this realization into action.

In order to "catch up in areas where..[the Soviets] were behind" Gorbachev adds a third priority to perestroika, exploiting diplomacy to gain foreign economic considerations.²³ That offensive is aimed at expanding economic ties and increasing trade. Gorbachev hopes "that increased trade, Western credits and technology can help stimulate the sluggish Soviet economy."²⁴ The Soviets still

²²Rakowska-Harmstone, 29-31. Gorbachev did not begin cutting members of the Party who disagreed with his perestroika plans until the March election. Two of "of his earliest moves were the removal of his principal rivals in the leadership struggle -Grigori Romanov and Viktor Grishin, respectively the Party chiefs of Leningrad and Moscow. This Gorbachev consolidated his power in the Politburo and simultaneously regained control over two important fiefdoms. Andrie Gromyko was promoted out of the way, opening a path for the new leader to take direct charge of foreign policy, assisted by a new foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, reputed to be a personal friend, and the two party officials whose past careers gave them a first-hand knowledge of the West: Anatoly Dobrynin, for many years Soviet ambassador in Washington, and Alexander Yakovlev, ex-Ambassador in Canada. Not coincidentally, perhaps, Shevardnadze's career started in the security police in Georgia. Gorbachev himself was clearly a protege of the late KGB chief and short-term General Secretary Yuri Andropov." pp 28

²³Gorbachev, p. 24-26.

²⁴Philip Taubman, "Soviets Push for Better Europe Ties", The New York Times, New York, 16 OCT 1988, p. 3.

pursue the political goals set by Marx and Lenin, but find themselves unable to compete.²⁵ Militarily and economically on the outside of the technological revolution looking in, the Moscow government has changed its strategic direction and is approaching its historical objectives from a new direction. The USSR has learned that it can match America's military strength but at a high price by spending, according to The Economist, "15% of its GNP on defence, compared with America's 7% and it is reckoned to be between seven and 12 years behind America in advanced computer-related technologies."²⁶ The Kremlin recognizes that in order for it to rescue its position, both politically and militarily, first it must compete economically.

The Soviet Union cannot continue its present levels of defense expenditures while simultaneously attempting to

²⁵Emile Burns, A Handbook of Marxism, International Publishers, New York, 1935, p. 1020-1021.

The Handbook of Marxism contends that the struggle between the two economic systems of capitalism and communism may at times require communist leaders to resort to economic manoeuvring and developing economic contacts with capitalist countries. Emile Burnes sites as Leninist doctrine the principal and "fundamental line to be followed in this connection must be the line of establishing the widest possible contact with foreign countries-within limits determined by their usefulness to the U.S.S.R., i.e., primarily for strengthening industry in the U.S.S.R., for laying the base for its own heavy industry and electrification, and finally, for the development of its socialist engineering industry."

²⁶The Economist, "The Soviet Economy:Russian Roulette" The Economist, London, 9 April 1988, p.3-4.

achieve its economic goals. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, reporting to the Joint Economic Committee, concluded that because the Soviet GNP will grow at an average of less than 2 percent over the next two years when compared to 3.9 percent in 1986, Gorbachev may be forced to "divert resources from defense, which now claims 15% to 17% of Soviet GNP, or divert investment from energy and agriculture."²⁷ While there is little problem for the defense industry to mass produce tanks, there is a problem in keeping pace with the technological changes in armaments in the West. According to Jonathan Eyal, a research fellow with the British Royal United Services Institute for Defense studies, many experts "conclude that the Soviet military, as currently organized, will never catch up with Western armed forces in advanced equipment."²⁸

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone believes that the first thing to remember in assessing Gorbachev's initiatives is to see them as changes of policy and not as changes of the system. Harmstone believes the system, as defined by the Communist Party's monopoly of power and the operational principle of democratic centralism (the control by the

²⁷ John Walcott, "U.S. Agencies Say Gorbachev's Plan Ran Into Problems" The Wall Street Journal, New York.

²⁸ John Greenfield, "The Big Shake-Up" Time Magazine, 8 Aug 88, p. 10.

leaders of the lower levels of the bureaucracy), has not been breached, and "there are no signs that General Secretary Gorbachev has any intention of altering it."²⁹ Moscow now recognizes it cannot continue to spend 15% of its GNP on defense and shore up the economic deficiencies of its allies at the same time.

A History of Russian and Soviet Economic Reform

Before the economic reforms of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, a characteristically Russian style of economic reform had developed. That model continued into Soviet Russia and to date Gorbachev's reforms reflect this historic influence.

Historians record five significant attempts at economic reform within Russian and Soviet history. The pattern begins with reforms under the reign of Peter the Great and includes those of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. In his book The Russian Dilemma: A Political and Geopolitical View, Robert Wesson assess that,

"Several times in Russian history, after a period of narrowing the gap with the West, the Russians have seen it widen again; the cycle repeats itself. The system of centralized planning, once a means of rapid industrialization, has become an impediment to further progress, partly because the economy has outgrown it, more because the spirit needed to

²⁹Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 27.

make the controls effective has been exhausted."³⁰

Finding their nation lagging behind the Western nations, the Russians traditionally open their borders to European development. Along with this development comes the cultural influences of the arts, sciences, and Western culture. To the Russian these influences are perceived as a threat, an invasion of their way of life; reacting to this threat they withdraw inward, closing their borders and trade with the West.

Peter the Great's reign (1696 to 1725) is often cited as the paradigm for Soviet economic reform.³¹ As Robert Wesson sees it, for example, "principally concerned with modernizing Russia so that it could more effectively fight the continuous wars of his time, he unashamedly borrowed

³⁰Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma: A Political and Geopolitical View, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974, p. 192.

³¹Wesson, p. 38. Wesson also believes Peter the Great "seems to have felt that he was doing an unpleasant although necessary one time job. "For a few score years only we shall need Europe. Then we shall be able to turn our backs on her." But the new industries and academies that he created were not self-sustaining, the West continued to advance rapidly, and it was necessary to keep borrowing on a larger and larger scale." This theme has been echoed by others sense Peter the Great first expressed this Russian perspective of European influence.

everything he could from the West, from administrative techniques to industrial methods."³²

While not reaching the magnitude of change achieved by Peter the Great, the period of 1855-1881 under Tsar Alexander II contained measures similar to the great five reformers of Russian-Soviet history. Like Peter the Great, this too was a reform of the peasant class, again initiated from the top. G.P. Armstrong points out that reform might have institutionalized local initiative except that Alexander II felt that he could not abandon the principle of autocracy. Armstrong expresses interest "that both Peter's and Alexander's 'reforms' were impelled by military failure -- Peter's reign opened with a defeat at the Battle of Narva, and Alexander's with failure in the Crimean War."³³

This reform pattern continued with Lenin who sought to adjust the tight controls of a Bolshevik government through the New Economic Policy beginning in the early 1920's. Once again Armstrong presents further patterns in Soviet history by identifying that the "forced exactions were replaced by a fixed tax; central directives stopped; and the peasants were allowed to grow and sell what they wished. Controls were

³²G.P. Armstrong, Gorbachev, "Reform", and the USSR, The Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, Canada, 1987, p. 12.

³³Ibid. p. 12-13.

also taken off small-scale industry and private companies were permitted in a small way."³⁴

Stalin's reforms closely followed the pattern set by Peter the Great. Stalin admitted, in Armstrong's view, that his "forced drive to modernize the USSR was motivated by fear that a backward Russia would be conquered by its neighbors. But he, like Peter, had to punch through his reforms by taking control of the administrative machinery. Stalin's analysis and answers to the problem formed the framework inside which his inheritors have had to operate."³⁵

Some Soviet specialists argue that like his predecessors, Khrushchev too faced the need for reform but from a different direction.³⁶ Thane Gustafson theorizes that nowhere is there a greater contrast between the first two Soviet generations and the third than in agriculture and the programs that supported it. Gustafson believes, that in effect, Stalin's priorities had been reversed. The Rand Corporation associate further argues "agriculture no longer

³⁴Ibid. p. 12-13.

³⁵Ibid. p. 12.

³⁶Wesson, p. 150. Robert Wesson asserts that in 1961 Khrushchev "hoped to restore the Marxist-revolutionary-utopian component by the ceremonious adoption of a new Party Program pointing to the future; but the promise, much weaker than that of 1919, was for little more than an improved welfare state."

subsidizes industrial growth, instead, it is now industry that subsidizes agricultural reconstruction and modernization."³⁷ Despite the growth of prestige by the Soviet Union under the Khrushchev administration, the old contradictions of economic growth continued to drag well behind neighboring Europe. Furthermore, as Robert Wesson points out, "from the latter 1960s the importation of processes and industrial installations was much increased, probably in awareness that the lag had been not diminishing but increasing during the previous decade."³⁸

Brezhnev too attempted to continue Soviet reforms; however, a lack of consolidated political power interfered with his plans. Likewise Yuri V. Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko also recognized the need for reform of the Communist system. Shortened terms, complicated by poor health, impacted on their consolidation of political power and the ability to force reforms through the Kremlin's quagmire of political bureaucracy. In the assessment of one specialist, "so far as one can tell, these fifty and sixty-year olds share the values of those who chose and trained them, they embrace and benefit from the Communist system, and they view the world in much the same way as their elders

³⁷Thane Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge London, 1981, p. 15.

³⁸Wesson, p. 119.

did.³⁹ This is not to say that there were no changes made during their time in the Kremlin. But all three attempted to continue the policies of their predecessors with little if any progress toward real economic reform. Much of the economic growth of the period was due in part to the build-up of the military and its weapons and not to a broad economic base.

Khrushchev faced the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brezhnev Euro-missile deployment, and Gorbachev has the Soviet Army's failure to end the war in Afghanistan quickly to give point to his attempts at reform. This is not to say that military failure is the cause for economic reform within Soviet Russia. However it is a contributing factor to economic reform. Any government when confronted with an expensive but losing war juxtaposed against a failing economy must consider which is the greater of the two national security risks, its enemies or its economy.

Mikhail Gorbachev criticized the 1956 20th Congress of the CPSU, saying their plans for economic development, principles for peaceful coexistence, and ideological measures fell short. Gorbachev writes that "the changes did not go all the way and were inconsistent under the weight of

³⁹Hans-Joachim Veen, From Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Domestic Affairs and Soviet Foreign Policy, Berg, Leamington Spa, United Kingdom, 1984, p. 353.

the 'legacy of the past' with all its dominant attributes."⁴⁰ Gorbachev charges that while the major political, economic, social and ideological measures had full party backing plans were not exploited to their full potential. In the words of Mikhail Gorbachev, the old system lacked stimuli for self improvement.

Gorbachev faces in the 1980s some of the same problems faced by Lenin after the Civil War of 1917-20. Both were confronted with the loss of a war, faced stagnation of industries and agriculture, and had to deal with the possibilities of internal revolt. Gorbachev has frequently stated that Lenin provides the philosophical basis for his perestroika efforts and is known to have taken an interest in Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP).⁴¹

As there is a historical pattern to Russian and Soviet reforms, there is also a pattern of reform failure. Reforms began during a period of economic stagnation and were centrally driven, inhibiting self-motivation and momentum; the result was a return to stagnation.

Peter the Great maintained tight control over his reforms. "Thus he experienced the dilemma common to all

⁴⁰Gorbachev, p. 43.

⁴¹Armstrong, p. 14-15. Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) began in 1921 and continued after Lenin's death in 1924, until Stalin discontinued the policy at the end of 1929. Armstrong submits that the NEP was not a 'reform' as such -- rather a retreat, a bandaid to help meet an emergency situation.

subsequent Russian attempts at reform - to modernize seems to require strong central control to overcome resistance, but over control is not conducive to further modernization.⁴² Lenin's, Stalin's, Khrushchev's, and Brezhnev's reforms have followed this pattern of central control, lack of support, reaction, and return to stagnation.

Gorbachev faces the same dilemma. In order to generate the necessary reforms, he must first drive change from the top down through the Communist bureaucracy. Like Peter and Alexander who faced modernization, Gorbachev must prepare Soviet leadership for the problems which come with modernization and the relaxing central control.

Gorbachev would seem to agree with this assessment of the dilemma which he faces. He has criticized his predecessors for not going far enough with their reforms. The economic reforms of the 50's, 60's, and 70's, says the Communist leader, failed to provide self development for the worker. Furthermore, Gorbachev claims his new program of getting the worker involved in the restructuring is a key element missing from previous reforms.⁴³ Party leaders say they are getting the worker involved by providing "a whole series of important legislative acts [which] have already

⁴²Armstrong, p. 16.

⁴³Gorbachev, p. 92.

been adopted in the course of perestroika. They include the Law on the State Enterprise (Association), laws to change the system of running the agro-industrial complex, on the school reform, individual labor, on combatting illicit incomes."⁴⁴ Unlike his predecessors Gorbachev realizes that in order for the reforms to work there must be support of the common man. The new Soviet administration is determined to try to overcome the historical problems of its Communist heritage and economy.

The goal of the Khrushchev era of having the highest per capita output in the 1980's is now being identified as the goal of the 1990's by the present Gorbachev regime. As the new Communist leader has pointed out in his book Perestroika, "we realize that improving socialism is not a spontaneous process, but a job requiring tremendous attention."⁴⁵

In his speech before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Conference in May 1987, Eduard Shevardnadze concluded that the driving message behind Gorbachev's perestroika campaign was that the USSR discovered itself in a "precisis" condition as a result of the failures of the Brezhnev regime to anticipate and take advantage of the economic realities

⁴⁴Ibid. p. 92.

⁴⁵Ibid. p. 92.

of the post-industrial age.⁴⁶ Alan Sherr maintains "this economic failure had spilled over to poison Soviet society generally."⁴⁷ In his speech Shevardnadze clearly identified the priorities of the Gorbachev administration: first economic reform; second, economic cooperation within Warsaw Pact countries; and third, trade links with the West.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Eduard Shevardnadze, "Abbreviated Text: Report by E.A. Shevardnadze at a Conference at USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 3, 1987," Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, No. 1 Aug. r, in FBIS-SU, Sept, 2, p. 25.

⁴⁷Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control, Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era, Unwin Hyman Ltd., Boston, 1988, p. 6.

⁴⁸Eduard Shevardnadze, p. 25.

CHAPTER THREE

Limits On Perestroika Goals

Having characterized perestroika as primarily an economic recovery strategy, we must consider what historical, military, political, economic, and diplomatic influences may exert pressures or constraints, and thereby interfere with or limit the objectives of the Mikhail Gorbachev regime. Three such pressures and their possible affects will be considered: history, military, political, or economic institutions; and, treaties and alliances. Functioning independently, or in concert, these factors restrict Gorbachev's ability to enact a carte blanche restructuring of Soviet economic, political, and social life. Mikhail Gorbachev must stabilize these forces.

Limits Imposed by History and Political Doctrine

Throughout Russian and Soviet history, security has been achieved through autocratic power. For the Soviets, personal freedom was traded for protection against invasion

from without, and political stability from within. Pluralism meant anarchy, while strong centralized control meant order. The noted Soviet specialist Robert Wesson argues, "as the Russians saw it through the centuries, the autocratic power created the empire, animated it, and made possible its continuation."¹ And as a former Soviet official noted, "they have never forgotten Lenin's lesson that any organized opposition to the regime may pose a mortal threat."² Gorbachev's restructuring, by calling for decentralization of power, strikes at the heart of Soviet political tradition.

Old-school leadership sees less power as absurd and restrained central power as a contradiction of Soviet ideology and Russian political tradition and culture. Decentralization further threatens, and understandably generates concern for, the preservation of the Party's source of its power.³ Decentralization in economics requires national administrative leadership to accept uncertainty, local latitude, and local control of information. Decentralization also demands that leadership accept constraints on its own power and freedom of

¹Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma: A Political and Geopolitical View, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974, p. 19.

²Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, Ballantine Books, New York, 1985, p. 233.

³Gustafson, p. 142.

intervention. Thirty-four-year-old Sergei Andreyev, a plant director writing in the Leningrad literary monthly Neva, charges that Communist Party bureaucrats who continue to "strangle" reforms could cause "the failure of socialism as a societal form." Many economic initiatives have been "a complete failure" because industrial administrators are almost all party members who are reluctant to make any moves that endanger their power, influence or jobs. Andreyev charges in his editorial that "this army of clever parasites" thought it was in their interest to "preserve the general chaos" of the old economic system.⁴

It is worth underscoring that the greatest enemy of the party leadership, and the main threat to their power, is not opposition but diversion, obstruction, and erosion. The ultimate success or failure of new programs depends less on the big decisions than on the myriad small ones (or even nondecisions) by which policies are designed, carried out, adjusted, and refined.⁵

⁴The Washington Post, "Communist Party draws fire in article in Soviet magazine", reprinted in The Kansas City Times, February 9, 1989, p. A-3.

⁵Gustafson, p. 143.

John Walcot, "U.S. Agencies Say Gorbachev's Plan Ran Into Problems", The Wall Street Journal, New York, April 25, 1988. In a declassified report to the Joint Economic Committee, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that "Soviet citizens will need to see some improvements in living standards if the regime is to achieve necessary gains in worker productivity and avoid widespread discontent."

What Gorbachev attempts to do, others before him have also tried. An essential problem of reform under the Brezhnev leadership, as well as all other predecessors, was the inability to unblock this age-old state of affairs hardened by "established careers, institutions, procedures, habits, and beliefs."⁶ The failures of the entrenched system, say some Soviet writers, is what created the need for perestroika.⁷ For example, one recent Soviet article observed, "we have never neglected the security of our state, and in the 1970's and 1980's, for instance, our capability to repel an outside threat increased unprecedentedly. At the same time, however, economic, social and political problems kept on accumulating in society. That is the reason why our national security failed to grow in the 'pre-perestroika' period. Only a sound, dynamic and self-confident society is capable of

⁶Ibid.

⁷Gustafson, p. 28.

Gustafson believes that because "agricultural policy was one of the issues on which Brezhnev based his claim to supreme leadership in the late 1960's, it is difficult for anyone in the Soviet elite to address the problem of how much is enough or how fast in agriculture without appearing to call into question the very basis of the ruling coalition. Then, once the bandwagon has started rolling, once institutional commitments are made and careers are on the line, the same features of Soviet politics that make it difficult to form a new consensus in the first place also make it difficult to challenge an established one; here one might list the absence of countervailing loci of power, the lack of access to influential media for independent criticism, and the resulting inability of losing players to regain advantage by widening the circle of conflict."

assuring its own security and the security of the state. That is why perestroika is a crucial factor in strengthening our security."⁸

Gorbachev is obligated to Marxist/Leninist doctrine and communist history. The restructuring, both economic and political, must be couched in the terminology of Marxism/Leninism. While it is true that Mikhail Gorbachev heads the Communist Party and Politburo, he is still bound by the laws of party politics.

Historically, Soviet politics has interpreted the granting of individual liberties as leading to the questioning of authority and the beginning of chaos and disorder. A Rand Corporation study made this assessment:

"Gorbachev and his Politburo colleagues are likely to be well aware from past historical experience of the potential dangers to internal stability that may be created by internal relaxation. Some of the past reluctance of Soviet leaders to relax repression of dissidents and police and anti-emigration controls has stemmed from a fear that once begun, liberalizing concessions to regime critics would only stimulate demands from inside and outside the country for further concessions considered incompatible with the Leninist system and unacceptable to the ruling oligarchy."⁹

⁸Igor Malashenko, "Ideals and Interest", New Times Pushkin Square Moscow, Moskovskaya Pravda Press USSR, Nov 1988, p. 26.

⁹Harry Gelman, Gorbachev's Policies Toward Western Europe: A Balance Sheet, Rand Corporation, California, 1987, p. XV.

The new interpretation of Leninism where such democratic concepts as the right to openly question authority, or the right of private ownership, are suddenly politically acceptable, contradicts earlier communist interpretations.

Limitations Imposed by
Military Requirements

History, politics, and economics exert one set of pressures on perestroika while the need to preserve an image of a strong national military will generate further limits. An additional consideration is the friction generated by the military high command, whose responsibility it is to defend the Soviet Union's national values and interests. Soviet political and military interpretations of Marxist/Leninist doctrine do not distinguish between war, revolution, politics, and society.¹⁰

Furthermore "the world did not need to wait until Engels' time to learn that 'nothing is more dependent on economic conditions than precisely the army and the navy,'"

¹⁰Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy", Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1986. p. 648.

nor did the nations of the world have to relearn this old economic law in the late 1980's.¹¹

Like their Russian forbears, the Soviets are thought to prize military power far more than most nations. Soviets define their status and national success through a strong military. It is the means they know best for "securing and enlarging their rule, and to judge others, respecting or dismissing them, according to their share of it."¹² Soviet military power and strategy is further based on the "correct utilization of the economic and moral-political factors that decide the fate of modern war."¹³

Russian or Soviet rulers, because of an insecure history or a sense of inferiority "identify security not only with distance but also with domination...[as]... absolute security for Russia has meant infinite insecurity for all its neighbors."¹⁴ This historical imperative can be seen in the comments of Sergie Witte, Prime Minister to

¹¹Herr Eugen Duhring, Revolution in Science, London, 1936, p. 188.

¹²Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy", Gorbachev's Russian and American Foreign Policy, ed by Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Westview Press, Boulder, 1988, p. 99.

¹³Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin, A History of the Art of War, Voennoye Izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 1986, p. 5.

¹⁴Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1979, p. 118.

Nicholas II, who once commented that the "world bowed not to our culture, not to our bureaucratized church, not to our wealth and prosperity. It bowed to our might...only [to] the power of the bayonet."¹⁵ Soviet tradition proclaims that everything from administration to education to economics is derived from the "single-minded battle for the creation of an efficient military machine."¹⁶

The realities of economics and economic setbacks require Soviet leadership to reduce heavy military costs. What Mikhail Gorbachev is proposing runs counter to the Soviet psyche. In the eyes of the Soviet leadership, both political and military, Gorbachev is cutting back on the one force which has in the Soviet view been a major contributor to the security of their homeland.¹⁷

Such a move also runs contrary to the holistic philosophy of Marxism which "explicitly rejects compartmentalization of the human experience, and narrow definitions of military strategy that neatly separate war and peace or the army and society ..."¹⁸ Such political directives also run counter to the views and experiences of

¹⁵Sergei Witte, Vospominaniya, Vol. 2 Moscow, 1960, p. 380.

¹⁶Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974, p. 94.

¹⁷Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf Jr., "Gorbachev's Choice Isn't Just Guns or Butter", The Wall Street Journal, New York, 24 March 1988.

¹⁸Rice, p. 684.

Lenin and his apostles who were impressed with the permanent interaction of politics and war as systematized by Clausewitz whose writings asserted that war, revolution, politics, and society were indispensable parts of [Soviet] Government.¹⁹ Vladimir I. Lenin cites Clausewitz as one of the most famous writers on the philosophers of war, and in agreeing with Clausewitz's statement that war is a continuation of policy by other means, Lenin also argues that "all wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them."²⁰

Gorbachev's perestroika calls for "sufficiency" which requires force reductions "to such a level where neither of the sides, while insuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations."²¹

¹⁹Rice, p. 648.

Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner, The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, Jane's Information Group LTD, Over Wallop, Hampshire, England, 1988, p. 62.

Soviet doctrine weighs equally on Marx and Lenin and emphasizes the importance of Lenin's appraisal of Carl von Clausewitz's theory that war is a instrument of policy and an continuation of policy by a different means. "If the policies of war are the violent continuation of the policies of peace then, in Lenin's view, the policies of peace could only be the non-violent continuation of the policies of war."

²⁰V.I. Lenin, Lenin: Collected Works, Vol 24, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 398-421.

²¹Quote taken from Col David T. Twining's Soviet briefing presented at the 17 August Warfighter VII Seminar. COL Twining is an MI officer and the Director of Soviet and East European Studies with the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. War College Carlisle Barracks.

Gorbachev's policies are the cause of friction between the party leader and institutional leadership memory and experience.

Party leadership, when formulating its military doctrine, views military considerations from the perspective of political policy. War and peace are alternating tools to be used to achieve the ultimate communist goal of a world united under communism.

Soviet military doctrine is based upon the calculations and inter-relationships of political doctrine, economic, scientific/technical, and military factors and military scientific data.²² In the Soviet Officers Handbook, Marshal A.A. Grechko defines military doctrine as the political policy of the Party and the Soviet Government in the military field.²³ Military doctrine is an extension of state directed political strategy and "represents a true union of politics and science in the interests of the defense of the country and the whole socialist community."²⁴

The Soviet Armed Forces leadership sees a strong

²²LTC Max Harshman, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1988. Based on a discussion between LTC Max Harshman and MAJ Willis Hintz on issues and theories of Soviet doctrine and strategy.

²³Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982, p. 5.

²⁴N.V. Ogarkov, "Deep Operations," Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya, [Soviet military encyclopedia], Vol.2 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 574-578.

military as a key protector from invasion. Yet the communist political leadership who claim the "Armed Forces as a tool of policy" state that in Europe, diplomatic weapons are more important in containing West European, NATO, and United States aggression.²⁵

Both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's policy reflected the idea that a strong military and diplomacy were tools to be used in combination. However, Mikhail Gorbachev states that the military is too expensive and not the proper means for waging campaigns in Western Europe. This reduced emphasis on military posture is tantamount to a loss of prestige for the military and an increase in prestige for the Soviet diplomatic corps. Therefore, political arbitration becomes the weapon which replaces the traditional tools of the armed forces. "It is political goals viewed in military terms."²⁶

"As far as Europe itself is concerned, since 1945 the Soviet Politburo had chosen to pursue its policies in Europe by peaceful means: propaganda and public relations, espionage, political initiatives, arms control negotiations, economic activity and, on occasion, subversion; i.e. anything which avoids the risk of armed hostilities, and which could, under most circumstances, be classified as normal diplomatic means to be expected in time

²⁵Donnelly, p. 62.

²⁶LTC Max Harshman, Soviet Doctrine and Strategy, private notes, Command and General College, Ft. Leavenworth, 1988.

of peace."²⁷

The animosity between East and West, capitalist and communist, has become more cerebral, sophisticated, and subtle. Diplomacy is using a softer language: sharper pens are replacing sharper weapons; "human" is being substituted for "class struggle"... "peace vice conflict"... "global concerns vice global threats." "Final victory of socialism on a world scale depends on domestic change now governed by laws of social development and accomplished by the class struggle, with its economic basis and the accumulation of domestic revolutions will bring about final transformation of international system."²⁸

The Limitations on Abdicating Alliances

Political alliances impose further limits on perestroika's goals. As Richard Pipes has written, "long before World War II, Stalin had established as the standard of security for his country the appearance of a 'ring of

²⁷Army Gen. Dmitri Yazov, Defense Minister, Pravda, Moscow, 27 July 1987.

²⁸Ibid.

brother states.'"29 Today Gorbachev's perestroika must contend with these historical alliances; the Soviets must "choose between a more immediate military security and a longer-term economic security."30

Sovereign states enter into alliances because political objectives cannot be achieved individually.³¹ And unless a metamorphosis into political federation occurs, the coalition is by design limited in time. National objectives change, national interests change, and the strain of alliance beyond national will is bound to "develop internal strains once the period of clear and present danger is past, since it must involve a relationship between strong and less

²⁹Richard Pipes, Survival Is Not Enough, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, p. 37.

³⁰Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987, p. 540.

³¹Helmut Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West, Yale University, New Haven, 1985, p. 3. Helmut Schmidt became floor leader in the Federal Parliament of the German Social Democratic Party in 1967 and served as Minister of Defense from 1969 to 1972. He then served as the Minister for Economics and Finance from 1972 to 1974. In 1974 he was elected Chancellor. Since leaving office, he has been a publisher of Die Zeit and remains a Member of Parliament.

"Given the economic, political, and security interdependence of the Western world, neither the medium-size powers like Japan, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Canada, nor even the super-sized United States itself, can be their own national means alone achieve their economic goals, their political goals, or their external security.

For the most part they cannot even achieve their economic goals by joint action unless they also harmonize their political and security policies. Nor can they achieve external security simply by cooperating in defense or arms control; rather they must simultaneously harmonize their political and economic policies."

strong powers, restricting the freedom of both without

giving either a decisive influence upon the policy of the other."³²

As military power has, for the Russian and the Soviet alike, translated into an internal buffer of security, so too has the existence of a buffer alliance created an external buffer or protection shield surrounding the Soviet Union. This historical goal of shielding the Soviet nation from invasion has been carried so far that now the Soviet is a threat to its neighbors. Protection from invading neighbor states had taken on a dual purpose for the Soviet Union. "Soviet policy toward Western Europe in essence consists of a broad effort to enhance the Soviet Union's own security by unilateral means while using bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, arms control, and other mechanisms to limit the security options of other countries."³³

It is first and foremost a protective barrier from hostile attack by neighbors. In the words of Evan Luard, "the Soviet Union requires communist governments in Eastern

³²The Hon. Alastair Buchan, "Problems of an Alliance Policy: An Essay in Hindsight", The Theory and Practice of War, ed by Michael Howard, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1965, p. 295.

³³John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe, Rand Corporation, February 1986, p. 23.

Europe partly because she wishes to see communist

governments everywhere, but mainly because in that area they are seen as essential to her security."³⁴

Secondly, the denial of such a barrier is also seen by the Soviet as an assertion of Western European prerogative or as an exclusion of Russian and Soviet European heritage. Historian Paul Kennedy makes the following assessment;

"The NATO alliance did militarily what the Marshall plan had done economically; it deepened the 1945 division of Europe into two camps, with only traditional neutrals (Switzerland, Sweden), Franco's Spain, and certain special cases (Finland, Austria, Yugoslavia) in neither one nor the other. It was to be answered, in due course, by the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact."³⁵

In the case of the Soviet Union, "this was reinforced, even after Stalin's death in 1953, by the conviction that any country which had become Communist should not be permitted to abandon that creed (the 'Brezhnev Doctrine,' to use later parlance)."³⁶

³⁴Evan Luard, War in International Society, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986, p. 177.

³⁵Kennedy, p. 379.

³⁶Ibid, pg. 379. Kennedy cites in his Chapter 7, "Stability and Change in a Bipolar World, 1943-1980", that in 1953, the U.S. National Security Council accepted the concept that the eastern European satellite states "could be freed only by general war or by the Russians themselves." Kennedy quotes from Bartlett's book Global Conflict, (p. 312) that "neither was possible.

For the Soviets, the economic and security alliance with Warsaw Pact nations protected Soviet Russia, and therefore became a security zone for the Soviet Union. Relinquishing this geopolitical barrier would require forgetting a thousand-year history of invasions by hostile neighbors.

It is a further Soviet argument that the denial of such a buffer zone, or the assertion that the nations making up the buffer belong to Western Europe, is an effort by Western nations to exclude the Soviets from Western Europe and therefore Western civilization.³⁷ William Pfaff, writing from the perspective of a Western political view, assess:

"The argument that the East European countries belong to Western Europe or Western civilization, or else that a distinct "Middle European" civilization exists, is disturbing not only to the Soviet leadership but to Soviet intellectual-and, indeed, to all Russian intellectuals-who see in it an implied exclusion

³⁷J. F. Brown, "The East European Setting, Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 20. Brown believes and argues that Moscow considers "Eastern Europe a source of Soviet political and ideological legitimization..[and].. there is evidently a Soviet conviction that the continuing allegiance of Eastern Europe and the preservation there of a system basically similar to that in the USSR is essential, not only for the Soviet system's domestic legitimacy but also for its overall standing and reputation. It is this factor that, more than anything else, makes hopes for Soviet toleration of any real Finlandization of Eastern Europe--allowing democratic institutions domestically while insisting on a neutralist foreign policy friendly to Moscow--seem unrealistic."

of Russia from Europe."³⁸

For the Soviet leadership to submit to a reduction or relaxation in the standing Warsaw Pact military posture is one issue; for any Soviet leadership to exorcise a thousand years of cultural xenophobia and dismantle nearly a century of geopolitical shielding against hostile neighbors is altogether another issue.³⁹ In his book A Grand Strategy for the West, former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

³⁸ William Pfaff, "Reflections (Central and Eastern Europe) Where the Wars Came From", The New Yorker, New York, Dec 26, 1988, p. 89. A frequently mentioned alternative to the current arrangement is the creation of a non-aligned or politically free zone often described as the Finlandization of East European Nations. "A Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe, respected, and even guaranteed, by the West European powers and the United States, and possessing a solid political base in the free consent of the East European peoples, is a perfectly realistic idea. Such a zone already exists on the Soviet Union's northern border, in Finland." William Pfaff, "Reflections (Central and Eastern Europe) Where the Wars Came From", The New Yorker, New York, Dec 26, 1988, p. 88.

³⁹ However there is the longstanding proposal from the Soviets that if NATO is dissolved then the Warsaw Pact will be dissolved. However the discussion of the disbanding of the two military alliances frequently hangs-up on the issue of the contractual alliances between the individual Warsaw Pact Nations and the Soviet Union for military assistance in the event of threat. An agreement which does not dissolve with the discontinuance of the Warsaw Pact and is an agreement which does not exist between the NATO countries. "No effort should be spared in order to develop a broad movement of the peace-loving forces of our continent against the extension or any modification of the Atlantic pact. This movement is favored by the constructive attitude of the Warsaw Pact states which have repeatedly stated and solemnly confirmed in the Bucharest declaration their readiness for a simultaneous liquidation of both military alliances." Leonid I. Brezhnev, "The Soviet View of NATO" Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Government, April 24 1967, p. 20.

states that for over five hundred years there has existed a Tsarist, and now Soviet, "policy known as 'Gathering the Russian Lands' which practically speaking, meant conquering other people's land." Schmidt states that this cautious but continuous expansion persists under Soviet leadership today. The former Chancellor further claims that "the Grand Strategy of Moscow is 75 percent traditional Russian strategy and only 25 percent communist strategy."⁴⁰

The influence of political doctrine, military will, and contracted alliances, working autonomously, or in harmony, constrict Gorbachev's ability to legislate the restructuring of economic will on the Soviet society. These are the forces which Mikhail Gorbachev must understand if perestroika is to realize its objectives.

The Limitations of Losing Superpower Prestige

Finally there is the dictate of superpower image in a bi-polar world. It has been a political and social goal of the Soviet Union to be seen as and accepted as a world class superpower. The political personality of the communist world cause, as a monolithic global power, clearly indicates

⁴⁰ Helmut Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West, Yale University Press, New haven, 1985, p. 25.

this passion for recognition, purpose and direction. Policy which distracts from this objective is not readily supported by Party officials.

Also limiting perestroika is the dichotomy which exists between Lenin's internationalist ideology and Soviet nationalism. Unresolved is the long standing goal of seeking political legitimacy in Western Europe and recognition as an equal superpower alongside the United States.

Marxism-Leninism espouses a centrifugal doctrine of a world under communism while Russian social history is centripetal, tending toward isolationism. The rise of nationalism had coincided with a decline in official ideology. Gail Lapidus proscribes to the view that the fusion of Marxist-Leninist gives the Soviets their cultural nationalism.

"Despite the apparent contradiction between the two, it is precisely the fusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology with its powerful sense of historical mission and its universalist perspective, with selective elements of traditional Russian political and cultural nationalism, reinforced by the global aspirations and satisfactions of superpower status, that form the core of the Soviet civic culture and endow it with both dynamism and mass appeal."⁴¹

In addition to these ideological and historical

⁴¹Gail W. Lapidus, "The Nationality Question and the Soviet System", From Brezhnev to Gorbachev, ed. by Hans-Joachim Veen, Berg Leamington Spa, Hamburg, 1987, p. 189-190.

contradictions there is another: "The Soviets look to Europe as both a political and historical glacis. Europe is both a source for political offensive strategies and a nucleus of international support in world politics. It is both a

political and ideological source for legitimization and of economic wealth."⁴²

J. F. Brown, of the Brookings Institution, believes "there is evidently a Soviet conviction that the continuing allegiance of eastern Europe and the preservation there of a system basically similar to that in the USSR is essential, not only for the Soviet system's domestic legitimacy but also for its overall standing and reputation."⁴³

If the Soviet Union is to keep its superpower image it must then address its third generation challenges: thus, as Thane Gustafson notes, "an increasingly affluent and independent-minded population, scarce and remote resources, and ever more advanced and demanding technologies require new policies and mechanisms to promote greater balance, quality, attention to detail, fast and flexible response, efficient use of resources, and innovativeness."⁴⁴

⁴²J.F. Brown, "The East European Setting", Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe, ed. by Lincoln Gordon, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 19.

⁴³Thane Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, 1981, p. 4.

⁴⁴Ibid, p. 4.

Strategy is not confined to the science of military art, it is infused into the art of politics as well. While strategy does prepare a nation for armed conflicts, it is in a broader sense the modern equivalent of what was, "in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, called ragione di stato or raison d'etat. It is the rational determination of a nation's vital interests, the things that are essential to its security, its fundamental purposes in its relations with other nations, and its priorities with respect to goals."⁴⁵

Strategy determines a nation's political and military purpose, from which derive a series of political and military objectives. These objectives assess both political and military requirements and preconditions, the achievement of which is likely to necessitate measuring of available and potential resources against the requirements, a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action. "In the case of the Soviet Union is the image of herself as a Super Power."⁴⁶

Conclusions

⁴⁵Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, "Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future", Makers of Modern Strategy, ed by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986. p. 863.

⁴⁶David Fraser, Alanbrooke, London, 1982, p. 215.

These factors: political doctrine, military will, contracted alliances, and the desire to maintain a world wide image as a superpower, working independently, or in concert, constrict Gorbachev's ability to enact a carte blanche restructuring of economic will on the Soviet political and communist society. Furthermore it is Mikhail Gorbachev the political scientist who must stabilize these forces within the political theory identified as the equilibrium of imperial overstretch.

CHAPTER FOUR

Perestroika's Effect On Soviet National Strategy Goals

To many Westerners the image of Khrushchev pounding his shoe at United Nations table and boisterously declaring "We will bury you" has long remained a vision of communism. Today, the program of perestroika, led by Gorbachev, raises doubt if the policy of the Soviet Communist Party is still "to bring first the USSR, and ultimately the whole world, to communism."¹

In this chapter the aforementioned Soviet goal of achieving world communism is assessed. Further consideration is given to the effects of perestroika on the Soviet goals for stabilized borders, economic and diplomatic influence in Europe, unification of territories historically considered to be Russian domains by the Soviets, and the Soviet goal of negating NATO and American influence in Europe. Documentation will be presented which suggests that

¹Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner, The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, Jane's Information Group LTD, Over Wallop, Hampshire, England, 1988, p. 62.

all of these goals have not been abandoned under perestroika, but are incorporated into the programs long-term objectives.

The Goal of World Communism

A nation's actions and reactions may be, with reasonable reliability, forecast through analysis of official statements, budgets and force structure, and scholarly writings sanctioned by governments. Of primary concern is the achieving of national security. For a Soviet leader, security goals are grounded in communist doctrine: "Marxism-Leninism predicts the Soviet will be in perpetual conflict with hostile imperialist states until the world is communized."² Has this goal of world communism been abandoned under Gorbachev?

Mikhail Gorbachev has identified Leninism as the philosophical basis for his perestroika. In assessing Gorbachev's policies it is important to remember that the changes are policy changes, not changes of the communist

²Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Johns, Jr., American Defense Policy, John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1968, p. 295.

system. There are no signs that the communist party's power monopoly has been breached.³

Parallels have been drawn between the problems faced by Lenin following the 1917-20 Civil War and Gorbachev's restructuring program of 1980. Both men faced stagnation in industrial and agricultural industries. And each leader confronted the threat of revolt against centralized governmental controls. Lenin's approach to the problems of 1920 was to relax centralized governmental controls. Massive "forced extractions" were succeeded by a "fixed tax"; "central directives stopped; and the peasants were allowed to grow and sell what they wished."⁴ Also permitted, in a limited degree, were small-scale private industry and companies. Gorbachev is a well known student of Lenin's New Economic Policy, and perestroika follows a similar path to Lenin's NEP. Gorbachev's perestroika today is no more capitalist than Lenin's NEP was in 1920.

Soviet military doctrine--which consists of political and military-technical components--is guided by the theories of both Marx and Lenin, with emphasis on Leninism and its belief "after von Clausewitz, that war is a tool of policy: war is nothing other than the continuation of policy by

³Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Reform", and the USSR; Gorbachev's Strategy for Reform, The Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, Canada, 1987, p. 27.

⁴G.P. Armstrong, Gorbachev, "Reform", and the USSR, The Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, Canada, 1987, p. 15.

violent means."⁵ To the communist world, communism is not a question of fact but a question of time. War and peace are only tools to be used toward that end. Soviet expert Christopher Donnelly contends that for the Soviets war "is a tool to be used to achieve the basic aims of policy of the communist-led state when, and only when, it is seen as the best tool for the task, and when it does not risk precipitation of a catastrophic (e.g. nuclear) setback."⁶

Additionally, it must be understood that the Marxist/Leninist definition of peace is not consistent with that of western democratic nations. Peace exists when there is "no war" or hostilities and this is only achievable when the world becomes communist according to Leninist doctrine. Under the interpretations of Leninism, peaceful coexistence is not goodwill nor is it evolution toward a political convergence with the West.

Like war and peace, detente is also seen as a tool. As war and peace are tools to be used to their best advantage in furthering communism, so too is detente an instrument to be used to its best advantages to reduce the "risk of a

⁵Donnelly, p. 62. Donnelly goes on to further define Lenin's interpretations of Clausewitz: "If the policies of war are the violent continuation of the policies of peace then, in Lenin's view, the policies of peace could only be the non-violent continuation of the policies of war."

⁶Ibid. p. 62.

catastrophic war as communism presses capitalism to its death throes."⁷

Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev believed that full world communism would be obtained in 1990. "Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 undoubtedly did believe that physical labor could be banished and that the Soviet Union would 'overtake and surpass' the West by the nineteen-eighties, reaching 'full Communism' by 1990."⁸ Khrushchev and Brezhnev further were convinced that the "national-liberation struggles" of Asia and Africa were signs that Soviet-style communism was expanding and would unite in alliance with the Soviet Union.⁹

While the Soviets may have recognized war as the best vehicle for communist expansion, in some circumstances it was not the weapon of choice for Europe. Since 1945, in Western Europe the Soviet Politburo has concerned itself with "propaganda and public relations, espionage, political initiatives, arms control negotiations, economic activity and, on occasion, subversion." Avoiding conflict and pursuing diplomatic initiatives with Europe was the guard against catastrophic war and would be accepted as "normal

⁷Ibid., p. 62.

⁸William Pfaff, "Reflections (Central and Eastern Europe) Where the Wars Came From", The New Yorker, New York, Dec. 26, 1988. p. 89.

⁹Ibid. p. 89.

diplomatic means to be expected in time of peace."¹⁰ As early as 1967, European security for the Soviets was being linked to the avoidance of nuclear war. The then Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, speaking before the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe, said "if a new war started in Europe it would become thermo-nuclear and envelope the whole world. European security is an important condition for preventing a nuclear clash."¹¹

The Soviets do see their Armed Forces as a useful tool to expand their communist policy, even though as Christopher Donnelly points out in Red Banner, "in an ideal situation, those forces would never be used in combat."¹² While military means were used in Angola, Ethiopia Afghanistan and S.W. Asia, war is not being "used directly to communise western Europe today is because it is clearly not, in Soviet eyes, the best tool for the job in that part of the world at this moment."¹³

The war for communist expansion is being waged indirectly: the generals are diplomats and the weapons are anything which avoids the risk of armed hostilities but may

¹⁰Donnelly, p. 62.

¹¹Leonid I. Brezhnev, "The Soviet View of NATO", Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Government, April 24, 1967, p. 5.

¹²Donnelly, p. 62.

¹³Ibid. p. 62.

be interpreted as normal peacetime diplomacy.¹⁴ The sobering consequences of nuclear parity and the threat of nuclear war have transposed the Soviet's convictions of Clausewitz's doctrine of total war. The political wisdom within the Soviet Union now views their nuclear arsenal as "deterrence weapons with limited utility in war."¹⁵

The Goal for Stabilized Borders

Historically, Russian leadership has maintained its security through stabilizing its frontiers, unifying Russian territories, and influencing European economic affairs by initiating alliances.¹⁶ Much of that gain, political and economic, the Soviets attribute to the dynamics of post World War II political arbitration.

To the Russian, and today to the Soviet, expansion was just as much a manifest destiny as the westward expansion was to the nineteenth century American. In comparison to the expansion in North America by the United States, Russia "spread across nearly three times as much [area] when it embraced the Eurasian steppe; and it was endowed with

¹⁴Ibid. p. 62-63.

¹⁵Dr. Bruce Menning, Director Soviet Army Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from interview conducted by Major Willis L. Hintz.

¹⁶Smith and Johns, p. 3-38

corresponding self-confidence" that manifest destiny was the reason to do so.¹⁷

A further similarity with American manifest destiny is that the price of expansion was often war. In North America, it was a combination of North American Indian wars and colonial wars with European powers. In Russia, it was wars with neighbors which were alleged defensive. Soviet historians have since tried to convince the world that their empire was a result of self-defense and a need for security.¹⁸

The need for security was met by pressing borders and overcoming enemies through war or occupation on the premise that attack was imminent. Out of this history have come two consistencies regarding Russian, and in later years Soviet, expansion policy. First, that space has served both empires, Russia and the Soviet Union, well and that property once obtained is not readily yielded. It was space which served as a strategic buffer for Russia from invasion by Poles in the seventeenth century, Swedes in the eighteenth, French in the nineteenth, and Germans in the twentieth.¹⁹

Since Stalin's death expansion has continued, although at a far slower pace. Khrushchev, for example, wanted the

¹⁷Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma: A Political and Geopolitical View, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974, p. 14.

¹⁸Ibid. p. 8.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 11.

Soviet Union to be admired rather than feared; "he also wanted to redirect resources from the military to agricultural investments and consumer goods."²⁰ Arguing the theory that there were separate roads to communism, Khrushchev, overruling Molotov, "removed Soviet troops from Austria; he handed back the Porkkala naval base to Finland and Port Arthur to China; and he improved relations with Yugoslavia."²¹ On the other hand, in 1955, in response to West Germany's entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Khrushchev established the Warsaw Pact alliance, securing the Soviets an aegis while at the same time avoiding yielding any part of the "borderlands [which] would be regarded as a calamity of the first order."²² For over six hundred years this pattern of Russian/Soviet expansion had gone about the task of enlarging, and to Soviet eyes, protecting mother Russia.

The Soviets believe that westerners who argue that East European countries belong to Europe and Western society are arguing to exclude the Soviets from Europe.²³ And the

²⁰Paul Kennedy; op. cit. p. 390.

²¹Ibid. p. 390.

²²Wesson, p. 11.

²³William Pfaff, "Reflections (Central and Eastern Europe) Where the Wars Came From" The New Yorker, New York, Dec 26, 1988, p. 89. William Pfaff further suggests that the concept of a Soviet security zone is a realistic concept. Pfaff sites that such a zone partially exists today on the Soviet Union's northern border in Finland.

Soviets, furthermore, did not interpret their expansionism as imperialism. To the Soviets way of thinking, it was the natural order of a growing state with a "sense of mission and traditions of ecumenical rule."²⁴ It was not imperialism but the annexation of contiguous areas; as Russia (Soviet Union) sees it, there is no boundary between new and old accessions. From the Soviet perspective "imperialism" is only overseas expansion.²⁵

The political, economic and territorial gains made by the Soviets following World War II have slowed if not stopped. The momentum which once fueled Soviet European manifest-destiny ambitions has succumbed to the economic strength and unity of the European economic community.²⁶ That surrender is one of method and approach.

The historical methods of gaining stable borders through overt aggression and intimidation are no longer useful tools for communist expansion in western Europe. That new tool is diplomacy reinforced with perestroika.

These are the traditions Mikhail Gorbachev brings with him as he conducts his public relations ventures into Europe. It is argued by some that Gorbachev's foreign policy facilitates Europe's return to what it once was, by conceding the Soviet Union's failure to transpose Eastern

²⁴Wesson, p. 12.

²⁵Ibid. p. 10

²⁶Dr. Harry Orenstein and Dr. Bruce Menning interview.

Europe, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany into eastern-looking nations and willing supporters of the Soviet Union and communism.²⁷ Aside from the fact that Eastern Europeans are culturally linked to the West, Eastern European economic systems continue to "diverge from the Soviet model, the magnetism of which is dissipated by Soviet economic stagnation."²⁸

The Goal of Influence and Predominance
In European Economic Decisions and Affairs

As noted by one prominent Soviet military affairs specialist, security for the Soviet Union traditionally could "best be guaranteed by posing an overwhelming threat to its neighbors, whether putative adversaries or friends."²⁹ This long-standing view is being rejected by present day Soviet thinkers who now believe "...Soviet security must be viewed as inevitably intertwined with America, and indeed, global security."³⁰

²⁷Pfaff, p. 89.

²⁸Wesson, p. 194.

²⁹R. Jeffery Smith, "Soviets Debate Basic Military Posture", Washington Post, Washington D.C., Aug 1, 1988, p. 1.

³⁰Ibid. p.1.

The Soviet viewed their gains in real estate following World War II in Europe as manifest destiny. However, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, coupled with western economic growth in the 1950's and 1960's, and the stagnation and corruption of the Soviet economy in the 1970's and 1980's, impaired any Soviet intentions for the continuation of its historical maturation.³¹ Exacerbating the political unity of European nations was the economic unification created by the Common Market. As R.J. Vincent points out "Russia no longer had the advantage of dwarfing a quarrelsome pack of smaller states, but faced an economically bound, potentially politically united Western Europe."³²

This coalition of interests blocked the Soviets' objectives, which included maintaining the legitimacy of the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe, breaking the European encirclement through the rightful predominance on the continent, and now the reduction and final elimination of the American presence in Europe.³³

Military intimidation failing, the Soviet Union under the direction of Gorbachev is seeking to increase trade and

³¹Dr. Bruce Menning, Soviet Army Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, interview.

³²Wesson, p. 186-187.

³³R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe", Adelphi Papers, 1975, Vol 119 Autumn, p. 2-3.

economic cooperation with the West. This sought-after collaboration includes a Soviet willingness to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Likewise the heretofore cited extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Common Market, is now seen by the Soviets as economic cooperation of interest and value.

Motivating these economic initiatives is the desire to stimulate the sluggish Soviet economy.³⁴ In October of 1988 the heads of state of Austria, Italy, France, and West Germany were guests of the Soviet government in Moscow. Since then, the number of foreign visitors and foreign investments has grown. Likewise, the number of visits by the Communist government officials to foreign countries in search of even further economic ties has increased.³⁵ As Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, remarked, "We are not rushing in pouring money down their

³⁴The Economist, "Eastern Promise", London, March 18-24, 1989, p. 85. The Economist editorializes that even the "Soviet satellite nations, The Warsaw Pact are facing economic hard times. The International finance Corporation of the World Bank has loaned \$27.5m into Yugoslavia, \$17.9m to Poland, and \$34m to Hungary.

Yugoslavia now has an inflation rate 240% and a foreign debt of \$21 billion, Poland's inflation rate is 30% and a total debt of \$39 billion, and finale Hungary's inflations is at 15% and debt set at \$16.6 billion.

³⁵Philip Taubman, "Soviets Push for Better Europe Ties", New York Times, New York, Oct 16, 1988, p. 3. Philip Taubman further quotes officials and diplomats as indicating Moscow's interest to prepare the political ground work for East-West talks reducing conventional forces in Europe so as to present the Soviet Union as a non-threatening neighbor as Western Europe heads into its economic and political integration in the 1990's.

throat. We are seeking good business opportunities at the same time as pressing them to change their system."³⁶

Furthermore, business leaders of the Paris-based International Gas Union (IGU) believe the Soviets are increasing their efforts to dominate internal Western European gas markets. President of the IGU, John Kean, cites the domination of the European gas market as a long-time goal of the Soviet Union and a concern of both U.S. and Common Market officials. Kean based his analysis and observations on conversations with Soviet, Finnish, Swedish and other petroleum industry officials. Mr. Kean predicts the Soviet plan is to "extend a pipeline into Finland, across Sweden, and hooking up with Western Europe's main gas grid."³⁷

Industry projections suggest that Russia contains about 40% of the world's natural gas reserves and can supply between half to three-quarters of Western Europe's gas needs.³⁸ A Washington, D.C., research and analysis group on East European affairs predicts that the Soviets are destined to become Western Europe's largest gas supplier. Conjointly, a northern gas hookup through Finland into other parts of

³⁶Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary, Great Britain, "Quotations", Pushkin Square Moscow, Moskovskaya Pravda Press, USSR, Nov. 1988.

³⁷Bill Paul, "Soviet Union Appears to Step Up Effort To dominate the European Gas Market", The Wall Street Journal, New York, Dec 7, 1987, p. 19.

³⁸Ibid., p. 19.

Europe would provide the basis "for further penetration of the German, French and British markets."³⁹ Central Intelligence Agency studies have shown that world market declines in oil and gas prices forced the Soviets to borrow heavily from Western banks in 1987. The major source of hard currency necessary for Soviet international business comes from their sale of oil and gas, a situation that increases the importance of gas exports.

The Goal of
Negating NATO and American Influence

As indicated above, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, combined with the later development of the Common Market and underscored by American presence in Europe, blocked the emergence of the Soviet Union into Europe by its traditional means. Leonid I. Brezhnev cited United States presence in Europe as encouraging West German militarism and as representing a further "threat to the security of the peoples of Europe."⁴⁰ That Soviet concern purports to be in the interest of all Europeans and demands

³⁹Ibid., p. 19.

⁴⁰Brezhnev, p. 7.

"that aggression by German imperialism on its own--or in alliance with anybody else--be excluded forever."⁴¹

U.S. Senator Albert Gore, Jr. cites public opinion polls indicating that Western Europeans perceive both the Soviet Union and the United States as equal threats to Europe's peace. The Senator further argues that even though Soviet military power "continues to grow", there is a public perception that we should behave as if it has already begun to recede. Senator Gore, indicates that the facts point to the contrary and contends that the Soviet Union's current concept of security has much in common with Soviet past history. That is, "every Soviet proposal continues to aim at bringing about the eventual disengagement of the United States from its forward positions in Europe and the Pacific Rim."⁴² Senator Gore doubts if perestroika offers undiminished freedom and security for NATO nations.

Dr. Bruce Menning and Dr. Harry Orenstein of the United States Army's Soviet Army Studies Office espouse the theory that historically, the Atlantic Alliance has survived because of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact external threat. Their theory suggests that the perception of a reduced Soviet threat will loosen the bonding among NATO

⁴¹Ibid., p. 6

⁴²U.S. Senator Albert Gore, Jr., "U.S. West Europe Roles in NATO Future", Defense Education Fund ROA, Washington D.C., Vol. 7 No. 1, January 1989, p. 15.

signatories, setting in motion a surge of questions as to the necessity for the continuation of NATO as it presently exists, or at least, recommendations that its charter and mission be amended.⁴³

In a 1987 article in Army Magazine, General Bernard Rogers expressed his belief that the intention of perestroika was to achieve through diplomacy what could not be won by means of war;

"The Soviets do not want war--they want to achieve the fruits of victory without the pains of war--to be able to put themselves in a posture where they can politically and economically impact nations through intimidation directly upon the West Europeans, take advantage of West European technology and all that through eventual neutralization."⁴⁴

In association with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John R. Galvin USA also suggests the Soviet Union is using words as weapons to undermine NATO unity. Galvin believes the Soviet strategy remains the same: "getting nuclear weapons and US troops out of Europe, disestablishing NATO, and disrupting Western unity."⁴⁵

⁴³Dr.'s Bruce Menning and Harry Orenstein, Soviet Army Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁴⁴Bernard A. Rogers, "Gen. Rogers: Time", Army Magazine, Sept 1987, p. 28.

⁴⁵Scott D. Dean, "Galvin to Lawmakers: Soviet Plans for Europe Unchanged by Perestroika", Armed Forces Journal International, Washington, D.C., Aug 1988. p. 22.

In his Army article, General Rogers asserts that a Soviet-directed propaganda and disinformation campaign aimed at West Europeans impacts upon NATO's ability to convince Europeans that a threat still exists. General Rogers believes such a campaign is centrally directed, very clever, very manipulative, with no intention of opening question and debate from Soviet citizens at home. General Rogers believes that Mikhail Gorbachev is a master at politics and public relations. According to Rogers, "people say, 'look what a reasonable man he is. Look how he smiles. He must have our best interest at heart.' Well as Andrew Gromyko has said, 'He smiles a lot, but he has teeth of steel.'"⁴⁶

Conclusions

When anticipating or projecting future ambitions and trends of governments, the analysis must first decipher historical patterns. From this point logical and objective supposition may be made. In the history of the Soviet Union it can be said that world domination is not just doctrine but is the foundation the state's political philosophy.

Also constant throughout Soviet history is the goal of obtaining stabilized borders. Whether Soviet manifest destiny is the realization of national security from

⁴⁶General Rogers, p. 30.

external threats, or is necessary for economic stability, the Soviets have not abandoned their long term directions of reaching out to obtain security.

Following World War II, the Soviets returned to the historically tested and proven means of aggression to obtain stabilized borders and economic influence in Europe. Through alliance, the Western nations attempted to block Soviet intentions and secure their fragile economic and political post-war recovery. Today we see the culmination of that Soviet overt drive being transformed into covert diplomacy. The ambitious ends of the Soviet Union have not changed but the means have. General war is an unacceptable risk. Therefore, the combatants have become politicians and diplomacy the weapons.

It has been said that "Stalin made NATO...Gorbachev may unmake it."⁴⁷ This sentiment, expressed in the late 1980's by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Senator Sam Nunn, echoes the thoughts of Senator Arthur Vandenberg forty years earlier. Vandenberg, arguing during the congressional debates over NATO ratification, expressed concern that unless the NATO treaty became "far more than a purely military alliance it will be at the mercy of the

⁴⁷Thomas A. Callahan Jr. "NATO at Forty", Defense & Diplomacy, Vol 7, No. 4, April 1989, p. 19.

first plausible Soviet peace offensive." The following chapter will examine the objective of NATO and the influence of short-term political solutions to long-term problems.

CHAPTER FIVE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization And Perestroika

North Atlantic Treaty

In early December 1948, representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers, Canada, and the United States began drafting what became, on August 24, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty, ending over a year of British pressure to create a military alliance among the countries of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Six months prior, the U.S. Senate had passed the Vandenberg Resolution, which urged the United States to pursue "collective arrangements" with other nations for national security purposes."¹

The North Atlantic Treaty was perceived, by the United States, as a means to "deter a less than general Communist attack," a perception which was further reinforced by the Korean experience. Korea was seen as additional evidence of a communist desire for expansion and the need for

¹Omar N. Bradley, A General's Life, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983, p. 496.

conventional readiness in Europe.² The Truman administration believed that Europe was a threatened vital interest, and therefore made its chief foreign policy goal the creation of a combat force to defend Europe.³ The Truman administration tripled U.S. ground forces between 1950 and 1953; "although much of this was due to the calling-up of reserves to fight in Korea, there was also a determination to convert NATO from a set of general military obligations into an on-the-ground alliance." The Truman strategy, according to Paul Kennedy, was to "forestall a Soviet overrunning of Western Europe which both American and British planners feared likely at this time."⁴

By 1957 however, political and diplomatic theorists had begun to suggest dissolving or disengaging the NATO

²David Holloway, "The Warsaw Pact in Transition," in David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp, The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 37. Holloway makes the point that the "Warsaw Treaty Organization (often called the Warsaw Pact) was ostensibly established as a counter to the incorporation in 1955 of the armed forces of what had become the sovereign Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Pact is both a political and military body and is dominated by the Soviet Union, but, especially since the various reforms announced in 1969, the smaller member countries have at least had some semblance of decision making. The Soviets carry about 80 percent of the Pact's economic burden and supply about 75 percent of its troops (the corresponding American shares in NATO are about 60 percent and 42 percent)."

³Russell F. Weigley, The American Was of War, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1977, p. 397.

⁴Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987, p. 385.

alliance. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan advanced the concept of disengagement as both a feasible and mutually acceptable program for Europe.⁵

By the mid 1980's, eighty percent of the world's investment in armaments and sixty to seventy percent of its combat aircraft and ships were mission oriented to a future battlefield in Europe. Also by 1985, world military expenditures exceeded \$940 billion, surpassing the entire income of the worlds poor populations. The two primary spenders, the United States and the USSR, each devoted "well over \$250 billion annually to defense with projections exceeding \$300 billion in the near future."⁶

NATO's Mission and Strategy

The Atlantic Treaty, according to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service, is a "defensive alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur."⁷ As mentioned earlier, that aggression was epitomized first by the Soviet Union and later included the Warsaw Pact alliance.

⁵Preston & Wise, Men in Arms, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1979, p. 359.

⁶Kennedy, p. 443.

⁷NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook, Brussels, 1985, p. 17.

Defensive planning is directed towards avoiding war because war is seen as an ineffective or uneconomical means of obtaining political objectives. The danger that a conventional war might escalate quickly to total nuclear war requires strategic planning. According to George Kennan, the first

"post war attempts to plan a strategy to meet the Soviet threat, when that threat was backed only by conventional arms, were 'long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment.'"⁸

For the past 40 years, United States foreign policy and strategy have promoted both economic prosperity and political stability through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁹ To date, this strategy has proven itself an effective defense shield for Europe.¹⁰

Concerns persisted among European leaders that security was conditional on preventing nuclear war between the two superpowers. U.S. State Department publications espouse the view that concerns expressed by Soviet leaders in 1967 remain today: "if a new war started in Europe it would become thermo-nuclear and envelop the whole world."¹¹

⁸Preston & Wise, p. 356.

⁹Joseph Nye Jr., "Understanding U.S. Strength", Foreign Policy, Fall 1988; Issue #72, 1988.

¹⁰Preston & Wise, p. 355-356.

¹¹Leonid I. Brezhnev, "The Soviet View of NATO", Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Government, April 24, 1967, p. 5.

Can NATO Survive?

One of the concerns of political, and supporting military, doctrine is the "character, essence, and purpose of possible future wars, and preparing both the country and military for that reality."¹² Such a formulation considers more than military factors. For example, in the case of the Soviet Union, its military doctrine is particularly "based upon the calculations of the political, economic, scientific/technical, military factors, and military scientific data."¹³

Over the past three decades, the often-declared United States political--and subsequently military--objectives in Eastern Europe have been European national self-determination, the creation of political and economic stability, and a return to national stability or the pre-World War II state. "The long term objectives of the United

¹²LTC Max Harshman, Soviet Doctrine and Strategy, Ft. Leavenworth, personal notes, 1988.

¹³Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982, p. 11. The authors further identifies the following stages in the development of Soviet Military Theory: Early development of Soviet military thought 1917-1941; Great Patriotic War & Stalin 41-53; The Revolution of military affairs 53-59; The Strategic Nuclear Buildup 60-68; Development of a controlled conflict capability 69-73; and Opening era of power projection 74-80.

States have never involved changes in the East European territorial status quo."

As stated above, the mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to stop Soviet expansion into Europe, create conditions favorable for both political and economic stability, and reestablish a status quo throughout Europe. Within that mission concept lies NATO's vulnerability. Eliminate the threat of Soviet expansion, European political and economic instability, and the threat to European cohesiveness, and the charter objectives for NATO are eliminated.

The effects of Soviet proposals under perestroika are producing reactions among Europeans. U.S. Senator Albert Gore, Jr., speaking in Washington, D.C., before the Reserve Officers Association, stated that public opinion polls indicated millions of West Europeans now see both the Soviets and the Americans as equal threats to their security. It is Senator Gore's argument that under the leadership of Gorbachev "the Soviet Union's conception of security still has much in common with the past. Every Soviet proposal continues to aim at bringing about the eventual disengagement of the United States from its forward positions in Europe and the Pacific Rim."¹⁴

¹⁴U.S. Senator Albert Gore, Jr., "US, West Europe Roles in NATO Future", Defense Education Fund ROA, Washington D.C. Vol. 7 No., January 1, 1989, p. 15.

The Soviets' stated objective under perestroika is to press Europe and NATO for military "sufficiency." Soviet Union Defense Minister General Dmitri Yazov defines sufficiency as the reduction of forces "to such a level where neither of the sides, while insuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations."¹⁵ As General Yazov has stated "we have concluded that it is difficult for Americans to attack us with nuclear weapons. We lived in the fear of such a possibility for three decades, but not any more."¹⁶ Yazov's promises that there will be "many an occasion that we shall again astonish you in the West," were realized two years later when the reduction of nuclear weapons was expanded to conventional weapons and forces.

French Premier Michel Rocard would seem to agree with General Yazov and wants to extend the reduction to conventional as well as nuclear weapons. Rocard contends that since the advent of Gorbachev and the ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Euromissile treaty, there is

¹⁵ Army Gen. Dmitri Yazov, Defense Minister, Pravda, Moscow July 27, 1987. The statements attributed to the Pravda article, quoting General Dimitri Yazov, were extracted from a briefing given by Col David T. Twining's Soviet briefing presented at the 17 August Warfighter VII Seminar. COL Twining is an U.S. Army, Military Intelligence officer and the Director of Soviet and East European Studies with the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. War College Carlisle Barracks.

¹⁶ Ibid.

a demand for conventional disarmament. Rocard asserts that two requirements for European defense are the "necessity of entering the arms control process, and of increasing our European capacity to up hold our part in a balanced alliance with the United States."¹⁷ Rocard terms the current defense situation "ridiculous" when three hundred million Europeans pray to be defended by 230 million Americans from 280 million Soviets.

A year and a half later, Yazov's claims that the Soviets will "again astonish you in the West" were realized and Rocard's conventional disarmament became a distinct probability. In December of 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced conventional Soviet armed forces cuts of "500-thousand men, about 10%, over two years."¹⁸ The proposed cuts would also remove 10,000 tanks, 8,500 guns and 800 combat aircraft from Eastern Europe and the western part of the Soviet Union. Some six tank divisions, according to Gorbachev, would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe over a two year period.

Within a month of Gorbachev's announcement, the European press began publishing warnings that Gorbachev's cuts did not balance conventional forces and calling for further cuts. It was estimated that to balance the forces

¹⁷Michael Rocard, Premier, France "Quotations", New Times Magazine, Pushkin Square Moscow, Moskovskaya Pravda Press USSR, Nov 1988, p. 7.

¹⁸The Economist, p. 19.

the Soviets would have to withdraw 35,000 of the 50,000 Warsaw Pact tanks stationed from the West German border to the Ural mountains. Furthermore, six tank divisions would normally have 70,000 men, but "reorganization of Russian units in Eastern Europe will include strengthening some of them with the extra 20-thousand men."¹⁹ The Director of the Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, Christopher N. Donnelly believes the cuts will not alter the Soviet ability to attack the West, and furthermore, may be part of an ongoing military reorganization. Donnelly theorizes that "the Soviet military still will have an offensive capability far superior to the West." Donnelly puts the ratio at 2-to-1 in comparison with NATO's forces, noting "that's all they [Soviets] need to succeed."²⁰

¹⁹The Economist, p. 19. The announced cuts by Gorbachev were not without costs to the Soviet leader. Gorbachev's Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Sergie Akhromeyev resigned. Akhromeyev, who was also Gorbachev's chief arms expert at each of the summits often spoke out against any unilateral gestures. The Economist editorials further predict such proposals by Gorbachev run "the risk of offending many of the senior officers in his armed forces. To this Mr. Gorbachev can only promise that a smaller army--perhaps with less reliance on conscripts--could be a more professional army."

²⁰Col. Herbert M. Hart USMC (Ret), Editor, "Wrap-Up: Gorbachev Takes Bold, Drastic Step Dec 7", The ROA National Security Report, Defense Education Fund ROA, The National Security Newsletter of the Reserve Officers Association of the U.S., Washington D.C., Vol. 7 No. January 1, 1989, p. 2.

General Hans-Henning von Sandrart, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Central Europe, and former Chief of Staff of the German Army, speaking before the Atlantic Council in early 1989, expressed his belief that the Warsaw Pact forces had a superiority of 2-to-1 in divisions and 3-to-1 in tanks and armored personnel carriers, with the field artillery ratios even worse. General Sandrart expresses the opinion that conventional force imbalance is the crux of instability in Europe and the possible cause of war. But he also believes that bringing NATO conventional forces in balance with "Warsaw Pact conventional forces would not [emphasis added] create the proper capability to deter war in and around Europe."²¹

The Soviets seem to be broadening their concept of security beyond the military dimension and into the realm of economic interdependence. Dr. Bruce Menning, of the U.S. Army Soviet Area Studies, Combined Arms Center, contends the

²¹General Hans-Henning von Sandrart, "Reinforcement Capability Increases Force Imbalance In Central Europe", Defense Education Fund ROA, Washington D.C. Vol. 7 No. January 1, 1989 p. 7.

R. J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe", Adelphi Papers, p. 7. R.J. Vincent asserts the balance of military forces in Europe is, at best, difficult to assess. (see The Military Balance 1975-1976 (London: 1155 1975, p. 95-102, on which this discussion is based) R. J. Vincent says "manpower numbers favor the East, quality of equipment tends to favor the West. The Soviet Union and her allies prevail in numbers of tanks and aircraft. NATO enjoys superiority in tactical weapons and anti-tank weapons. Geography helps the East, technology the West."

Soviets have perceived a diminishing threat from the West beginning as early as 1983 with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. According to Dr. Menning, the Soviets began questioning their own theory of imminent war when the United States began talking about developing long term military research projects. This, says Dr. Menning, coupled with the Soviet view that the economic power and influence of the United States, is weakening in relation to that of Japan, China, and the EEC, contributed to the shift from military to diplomatic tactics as the tool of choice for Europe.²²

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., concludes that the new Soviet thinking has yet to modify Soviet foreign policy actions to the satisfaction of American conservatives. Nye contends that the American conservatives still perceive the Soviet Union as a "revolutionary power committed to our overthrow." Even with a change in Soviet foreign policy, he argues it will be difficult for Americans conservatives to agree upon their meaning: "those who remain suspicious can always discount change as merely tactical."²³

There is also the belief on the part of some U.S. officials that the U.S.S.R.'s economic and political

²²Dr. Bruce Menning, Director, Soviet Army Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. private interview conducted by Major Willis L. Hintz on April 18, 1989.

²³Nye, p. 390.

maneuvering in the international arena is designed to weaken ties between the U.S. and its allies. As noted earlier, these concerns are reinforced by public opinion polls, both in the United States and Europe, attesting to both Gorbachev's popularity and his successful cultivation of an image of the USSR as the new peace-loving country. The new Soviets' political, military, and economic initiatives are producing strains within NATO. The alliance is also being confronted with the developing dispute over the extent to which Europeans should "pay for their own defence instead of depending on the presence of 300,000 American troops in Europe."²⁴

Conclusions

Is perestroika purely an economic restructuring within the Soviet Union, or is there an element of maskirovka to the long-term goals publicly articulated by party leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev? Does perestroika conflict with or complement Soviet goals to sunder the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and weaken United States military presence in Europe?

²⁴Ray Moseley, The Chicago Tribune, U.S.A. "Test of Sincerity", exclusive for New Times, Pushkin Square Moscow Moskovskaya Pravda Press USSR Nov 1988, p. 13.

Political and military surprise and deception are two concepts which often defy precise, analytical descriptions and probability determination. Once a political and or military surprise and deception has occurred it becomes part of history, its description left to historians, becoming known and understood almost exclusively after the fact.²⁵ To a degree this definition serves to characterize perestroika. While perestroika has definition, Gorbachev defines it as a program to confront, or avert, economic stagnation and economic depression, it exhibits discriminating nuances whose political characteristics defy precise probability determination. While it can be easily argued that perestroika is an economic restructuring of the Soviet economy, it can just as easily be maintained that perestroika is principally intended to further the long-term Soviet objectives in Europe. Diplomats and government officials should be cognizant of the potential for surprise and deception if their political institutions disregard the potential long-term consequences and subtle implications of perestroika.

NATO's military effectiveness is founded in the alliance's political legitimacy. That legitimacy depends on a perception of equity--the belief in shared risks and

²⁵Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. March, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought", Applied Tactical Operations, Vol II, A396, Academic Year 1988-89, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 411.

burden. As expressed by Senator Gore, the undermining of that legitimacy is a "greater threat to NATO's defenses than any single problem we may have in purely military terms," and that legitimacy is eroding through perestroika. Senator Gore identifies the causes as "the relative decline of American economic power, the reassertion of the idea of European identity, and the popular appeal of perestroika and glasnost."²⁶

The NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John R. Galvin, USA, concurs that Soviet goals have not changed. General Galvin accepts the proposition that the Soviet Union is in a period of transition, but he contends that Soviet strategy still pursues a policy of "getting nuclear weapons and US troops out of Europe, disestablishing NATO, and disrupting Western unity."²⁷ Galvin argues that the Soviets are using words instead of weapons to undermine NATO unity.

The late Soviet Lt. Gen. P.A. Zhilin wrote that the most important principles of the Soviet art of war include surprise, and the exploitation of moral-political factors,

²⁶Gore, p. 14.

²⁷Scott D. Dean, "Galvin to Lawmakers: Soviet Plans for Europe Unchanged by Perestroika, Armed Forces Journal International, Washington D.C., Aug 1988. The comments made by General John R. Galvin, U.S.A. were made before the Congressional Military Reform Caucus in association with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (SCIS). The discussion entitled "A View From the Front" presented General Galvin's assessment of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance and the generals recommendations to reduce tensions in Europe.

and the full utilization of all means and methods for achieving victory. In his 1986 book, A History of the Art of War, Zhilin claims that according to military science, if the aggressor were to achieve strategic surprise and if the "other side were not prepared to make a timely retaliatory attack, there would be a swift evolution and resolution of the war."²⁸

What, then, of the argument that the Western alliance is an alliance of the past and that a neutral stance might be more appropriate?

The future of NATO depends on the alliance's adaptation to the new circumstances generated by perestroika. The fundamental issue before NATO is the extent to which the membership will attain agreement within their alliance community, and arrive at a consensus of mutual interests in the broadest areas of cooperation. The dynamics of European political and economic history, inside and outside NATO, suggests the feasibility or probability of an insularity affecting common action. David Popper identifies two likely outcomes. One or more NATO countries may decide to no longer participate in NATO defense arrangements but to rely on their own resources, and the general NATO obligations, for collective defense. Popper sees a second form emerging if a group of the NATO nations--

²⁸ Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin, A History of the Art of War, Voennoye Izdatel'stov, Moscow, 1986, p. 9-10.

that being a European alliance with the North American members of NATO subset of European nations--decides to organize a purely European alliance.²⁹

It is written that in the year 100 B.C.E., Chinese philosopher and general Sun Tzu wrote "to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."³⁰ General Bernard Rogers contends that the Soviets do not want war. Their goal is to achieve their objectives short of war. General Rogers argues, Soviet political and economic history demonstrates a clear pattern of posturing for political and economic influence through intimidation. This is the message of General Rogers in his Army Magazine article "Time". General Rogers further contends that the Soviets are trying to take "advantage of West European technology" with the goal of eventual neutralization.³¹

²⁹David H. Popper, "NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment", Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Government, April 12, 1965. Also for a more indepth look at the concept of a European nation and armed force see MMAS thesis by Patrick F.P. Nopens, MAJ, Belgium, AR, "The Revival of the West European Union" dated 1988-89.

³⁰Sun Tzu. The Art of War, Edited by James Clavell, Delacorte Press, New York, 1983, p. 15.

³¹General Rogers, "Gen. Rogers: Time", Army, Army Magazine, Sept 1987, p. 28.

A diffusion of world power and influence is affected as much by political form as by geographic location. Alan B. Sherr, in The Other Side of Arms Control, Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era, asserts that international influence through military power is now yielding to economic power. Sherr points out that "power has spread out geographically because of the growing assertiveness of some of the less developed states and of the nonaligned nations."³²

In 1988 the U.S. Department of Defense recognized that Soviet "economic liberalization would in fact prove compatible with its continued political domination" of objectives of Europe. The Defense Department projects the theory that if Soviet foreign policy goals succeed, rapid economic growth would permit military budgets to increase and thereby increase the threat to West Europe, Southwest Asia, and East Asia. The Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy further contends that Soviet writings stress "war could remain non-nuclear, yet be global in scope, economically demanding, and protracted." Such wars could stress both industrial mobilization and lines of communication. The Commission writes that "if conventional wars of this sort become a focus of U.S. planning, we will

³² Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control, Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era, Unwin Hyman Ltd, Boston, 1988, p. 5.

have to pay more attention to preparing for industrial mobilization and protecting lines of communication."³³

As pointed out by Senator Gore, "the problem for NATO is that, while Soviet military power remains, the public image of the Soviet Union as a dangerous enemy is fading." The Senator says if the alliance fails to respond properly, NATO risks undermining its legitimacy with its constituents. On the other hand, if NATO responds on the speculation that Soviet promises are fact not assumptions, the Alliance may undermine its security." Senator Gore contends that what threatens European economic security also threatens Europe's military security.³⁴

It is probable that increased stress between NATO and the U.S., due to trade and economic issues, will generate a decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, increase American inflation, expanded U.S. exports, and damage to trade relations with Europe and Japan. The imaginative proposals of an articulate and charismatic Soviet leader are producing new and more confusing psychological environment in Western Europe.³⁵

³³Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy, "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment", U.S. Department of Defense, April 1988, p. 15.

³⁴Gore, p. 16.

³⁵William H. Luers, "U.S. Policy and Gorbachev's Russia", from the book Russia and American Foreign Policy, edited by Sewryn Eialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Westview Press, Boulder & London, 1988, p. 429.

William H. Luers advises American policy makers to be alert to change in Europe. Luers predicts that the German reunification question will reemerge among Europe advocates. Central to the Luers thesis is the relationship between France and Germany: a strong Alliance depends on the "closer political and even military relationship between France and the Federal Republic of Germany." It is the author's contention that a role for Germany and France as the "European pillar of NATO makes sense for the United States" and NATO. One of the central failures of NATO, says Luers, is the Alliance's inability to keep pace with political doctrine.³⁶

The challenge of perestroika is not its near-term objectives but its long-term goals. NATO can survive perestroika if its leadership enjoins a long-term political and economic mission equal in sophistication and creativity to Gorbachev's perestroika. As Joseph S. Nye has said, "even if changes in Soviet foreign policy do occur, it will be difficult for Americans to agree upon their meaning; those who remain suspicious can always discount change as merely tactical."³⁷

³⁶Ibid. p. 429-430.

³⁷Nye, p. 390.

CHAPTER SIX

Can NATO Survive Perestroika

In summary, at the outset, the thesis objectives were identified as: first, determining if perestroika was solely an economic restructuring of a faltering Soviet economy; secondly, establishing if perestroika enhanced political surprise and economic deception in support of historically Soviet national goals; and third, ascertaining the impact of perestroika on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

To argue that perestroika is merely a programmed response to avert a Soviet economic depression is a convenient analysis which fails to account for perestroika's complexities. Likewise is the assertion which describes perestroika as a strategic deception and an overall scheme to sunder NATO. Perestroika is at its foundation an economic program. However, it is also a program which does not contradict long-range soviet political objectives in Europe but serves to unobtrusively expedite them.

The foregoing analysis supports conclusions that perestroika's architects have not abandoned Soviet political

ambitions and strategies but have adapted the means for achieving their ends through a required economic recovery plan.

It is also a supported observation that, identifying perestroika as the symbol of a declining Soviet Union is unwarranted and premature. To remark that perestroika symbolizes the end of a post World War II tactical perspective used in pursuit of economic influence and political dominance in European affairs, is accurate. Furthermore, it is also correct to identify perestroika as the beginning of a new and more intricate level of diplomatic conflict between NATO and the Soviets, one which demands forethought supported by long-range planning.

Perestroika's threat to NATO is not its short-term goals but its long-range success. The Soviets believe: first, that the United States is losing its economic influence throughout Europe and within NATO; and secondly, that technology is changing the balance of power from a bipolar world to a multi-polar world. If the Soviet Union is to remain a world power, the Soviets must then become economically involved with that change. The threat of continued economic decline in the Soviet Union has forced the Soviets to rethink their approach to world politics and to become more cordial in world politics as a means to this end.

Perestroika's threat to NATO also depends on the Soviets ability to lessen the threat level between the Soviet Union and NATO to a degree which forces NATO to abate its readiness response capability. Such measures serve to diminish the economic pressure on the Soviet Union. This economic relief could provide the Soviets necessary time to repair their technological short-falls, while restoring the Soviet economy. It is these long-term goals which the NATO leadership and their political counterparts must deal with in the next decade. The test is not in their ability to find quick answers but to develop long term solutions which take into account the possibilities perestroika presents. If NATO plans well it can survive.

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